Alex WellersteinVerified account

Which is only to say — I suspect that in any case where a small, weak country has a few nukes and is against a much larger adversary (nuclear or not), first-use is going to be part of their deterrence (and sort of has to be). Cf. Pakistan.

So I wouldn't call the DPRK approach "peculiar." If your adversary has conventional decapitation capability, then a first (nuclear) use threat *has* to be part of deterrence. Otherwise it doesn't accomplish anything. (And first-use is not first-strike.)

That's @NarangVipin's theory. It's not wrong, but it's also not the only/primary incentive for first-use by NK. Nuclear scholars have erred by rallying around that theory too tightly. Again, it's right, but offers only one rationale for first-use; there's more than that

The distinct logics matter bc NK will soon have a secure second-strike capability, which--if not for their peculiar beliefs about coercion--would lead them to an assured retaliation posture. But their beliefs will ensure that first-strike remains on table even w 2nd-strike #s

Good discussion gents, but @WonkVJ your assertion that NK has "peculiar beliefs about coercion" don't seem to be supported by the KJU address or the 12/30 report published by KCNA. Can you elaborate? I believe @wellerstein has described the NK view of n-deterrence accurately.

We're mostly on the same page. Described accurately, not completely. Here's a sample of NK's peculiar beliefs about coercion: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/the-ec-121-shoot-down-and-north-koreas-coercive-theory-victory …

NK first-use is overdetermined. I was one of the earliest advocates of asymmetric escalation logic, but it's only one rationale that would lead to first-use