I am not sure that nobody believes it is not credible — there are imaginable circumstances — but in any case, comparing present-day US policy to DPRK is bound to be a mismatch because of the obvious asymmetries.
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It's peculiar to believe that deterrence is best achieved by going on the offense repeatedly (through the accumulation of violence)
Is it peculiar? Again I am just thinking about US behavior over last 60 years, in which deterrence of Soviets and spread of Communism was used repeatedly as motivation for getting involved with proxy wars, etc. I am just not so sure any of this is "peculiar."
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Not sure of the benefit of litigating "peculiar." To me believing you can achieve deterrence by resorting to violence first is peculiar because it's aggressive and pathological. It overturns much of the third wave of deterrence theory. But you're right there's precedence
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(My general suspicion with DPRK is that somewhere they have a poli sci manual called "how deterrence works in the west" and they refer to it constantly. Their behavior with nukes seems textbook predictable to me — literally. More than US policy is, frankly.)
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I agree with this without caveats (a rarity!)
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Tx, though I still don't see much evidence that KJU sees value in nuke first use unless he believes NK is under attack or there is imminent threat of attack (which is basically U.S. posture). In any case, key takeaway fr NY address is the interest in NK-SK risk reduction talks.
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Agree w your last point. Was answering your initial Q about their beliefs about coercion. Re: first use, I don't see the US using nukes to escalate to de-escalate but I do think that's plausible (likely) for NK. That's huge difference between US and NK IMO. Otherwise same same
End of conversation
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