I've re-read KJU's speech 5 times. Two final thoughts. 1) Even though KJU declares nukes are for deterrence, NK has a peculiar set of beliefs about how deterrence works, making first-use still plausible. 2) I don't recall the last time (ever?) NK said "...this is NOT a threat"
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US refuses to give a NFU pledge, but nobody believes US first-use possibility is credible--even US officials said it wasn't credible during Obama era. KJU's openness to first use is more credible
I am not sure that nobody believes it is not credible — there are imaginable circumstances — but in any case, comparing present-day US policy to DPRK is bound to be a mismatch because of the obvious asymmetries.
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Which is only to say — I suspect that in any case where a small, weak country has a few nukes and is against a much larger adversary (nuclear or not), first-use is going to be part of their deterrence (and sort of has to be). Cf. Pakistan.
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So I wouldn't call the DPRK approach "peculiar." If your adversary has conventional decapitation capability, then a first (nuclear) use threat *has* to be part of deterrence. Otherwise it doesn't accomplish anything. (And first-use is not first-strike.)
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That's
@NarangVipin's theory. It's not wrong, but it's also not the only/primary incentive for first-use by NK. Nuclear scholars have erred by rallying around that theory too tightly. Again, it's right, but offers only one rationale for first-use; there's more than that -
The distinct logics matter bc NK will soon have a secure second-strike capability, which--if not for their peculiar beliefs about coercion--would lead them to an assured retaliation posture. But their beliefs will ensure that first-strike remains on table even w 2nd-strike
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So one of the things that disturbs me about the current situation is that NK first-use is overdetermined
End of conversation
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