There are two common tacit knowledge errors I see in STS security scholarship. 1) Under-appreciation of role of instruments as reducers of tacit knowledge. (The difference between buying a Geiger counter and making one from scratch.)
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The practical effect is that in many fields (not all), as "science marches on," tacit knowledge requirements will drop. Tacit knowledge requirements for a new nuclear state probably lower than they were in the 1940s, for example, because reactors no longer bleeding-edge tech.
For biothreats, the availability of new tools that let you, say, synthesize living viruses from computer code, will make the tacit knowledge requirement drop from "you need to be the very best in this field" (as when it was first done in 2002) to "you need access to the tool."
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Thanks, Alex. Good points.
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All of this said, I would argue worries about garage style de novo synthesis of, say, smallpox or weaponization of other agents, are at best premature.
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US & Soviet programs, among others, point to array of tech & processes involved in bioweapon making. Not all are being black boxed much less to same extent
End of conversation
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