Deterrence works both ways. We can't bluff them, they can't bluff us. Nuclear blackmail has never worked.
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They didn't make Mao think he could invade Taiwan, did they?
There are ways to communicate, "if you do this, real war will start." Like, say, keeping US troops in South Korea.
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Nuclear blackmail works both ways. We can't say, "disarm or we'll nuke you," because they'll know that is a bluff. Ditto in reverse.
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Articulating real, solid, "red lines" is difficult but clearly possible.
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If we could deter Stalin and Mao, we can deter KJU. DPRK is small, weak, poor, low-pop. No chance of survival in real war. They know this.
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I don't think the situations are equatable. DPRK isn't even a self-sustaining state. The line where they have as much to lose but more to
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Gain by serious action isn't the same as Mao/Stalin exercising expansionist attitudes. KJU is volatile in a different way.
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Disagree. If you think KJU is worse than Mao, go re-read on the Cultural Revolution. PRC in '64 was million times crazier than current DPRK.
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Anyway, point still stands: you believe that KJU is somehow historically undeterrable. I see no reason to believe this, many reasons not to.
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I guess we disagree on effective/necessary deterrence. Useful debate for me, anyway. May your next opponent be less obstinate.
End of conversation
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