I don't find solace in the theory that KJU is rational and not suicidal. DPRK has had decades to perfect leadership bunkers.
We have to—and we can. We have 100X the population, 1000X the economy, and 1000X the nukes they do. They know striking first is suicide.https://twitter.com/ArmsControlWonk/status/921357753720991744 …
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I don't think he's stupid enough to think that nuclear use wouldn't end up with him dead, and his country ruined. Bunkers or not.
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The Russians lost over 20 million in WWII. I believe KJU would sacrifice millions if he thought it would be the end of the USA/Japan.
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North Korea only *has* 25 million. Soviet Union could lose 20 millions and still have +100 million. North Korea cannot.
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Separately, we should remember that the Soviets lost that many not because they were warmongers, but because they were invaded by Nazis.
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They lost that many because they were actually suffering a genuine existential threat. They did not risk such numbers in Cold War.
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Would DPRK risk millions in the face of a truly existential attack? Probably. The US would, too. Hence deterrence.
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Would they run that risk if they could avoid it? I see no reason to assume so, and that would be historically quite remarkable if they did.
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Deterrence didn't work for the 46 brave ROK Sailors of the Cheonan. How bold will KJU be when he has 6th largest stockpile in World?
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46 soldiers is not 100K civilians. Terrible — but not anywhere near the same. (And KJU not KJI, anyway.)
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Nobody claims deterrence would stop all nasty/undesired/abhorrent state actions. But would probably stop nuclear use, because would
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guarantee a regime-changing response. DPRK knows this. They bet that 46 sailors wouldn't guarantee that once they had nukes—and were right.
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Which incidentally works perfectly with deterrence theory. US in 2010 not willing to risk Seoul for 46 ROK sailors.
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Deterrence may work but why take that chance? KJU may decide to conduct a first strike against US or allies and have sub based deterrent.
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It's a fallacy to believe it's for regime survival. DPRK nuke program is decades old. Hussein killed in 2006 and Gaddafi 2011.
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DPRK's regime threat fears pre-date the 21st century. Look into their history. US has kept troops on the southern border since 1950s.
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In exchange for Peace Treaty with ROK. 2
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I think that's a pretty optimistic view of our posturing/diplomatic capability.
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Which is to say, I think repeating "we will not accept a nuclear-armed DPRK" is not in line with that goal, if that is the goal.
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(And you remove your troops from ROK)
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As I said... optimistic! :-) I'd love to believe the Trump admin was engaging in some kind of complex strategy. I see no evidence of that.
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