Anyway. Why even have a second bomb, only 3 days after the first? Most people don't realize that this entire schedule was set by the weather. Originally the plan was to have a week between the bombings, to give the Japanese time to react.
-
-
This is why many people who have studied it have found Nagasaki not that justifiable. Ted Telford, the chief US prosecutor at Nuremberg, concluded that had had "never heard a plausible justification of Nagasaki."
Show this thread -
I think one can come up with "plausible justifications" for Hiroshima, even if they are debatable. Nagasaki is definitely a trickier moral issue, if your concern is with not slaughtering masses of civilians unnecessarily.
Show this thread -
(If your argument is, "the Japanese [people] were evil and deserved it," then clearly the issue of plausible justification isn't an issue for you. I always get many replies to this effect.)
Show this thread -
(I understand where they are coming from, especially from people who are from countries brutalized by the Japanese military. I don't think that justifies targeting children, as I've written on here before. But I understand it.)
Show this thread -
Anyway, the most important consequence of Nagasaki, in my opinion, was that it greatly disturbed Truman. He had just gotten the casualty reports from Hiroshima and was already unnerved. He didn't know another bombing was going to happen so quickly. His attitude quickly soured.
Show this thread -
The next day, he got a memo from General Groves saying they'd have another bomb ready in a week or so. Truman's reply was immediate: no further bombs were to be dropped without his express authority. He told his cabinet he couldn't bear to kill "all those kids."pic.twitter.com/NvthB4Ymvd
Show this thread -
Truman's reclamation of authority, and insisting that all further nuclear use orders be routed through the President (and not the military), changed the nature of US nuclear weapons going forward. He reinforced this many times in his later presidency.
Show this thread -
In fact, he outright refused to give the military "custody" over the bombs themselves — they didn't actually *have* the nukes that were being produced in the Cold War, they were kept by the civilian Atomic Energy Commission. (He eventually gave them 9. Eisenhower changed this.)pic.twitter.com/l7jqRFJC9c
Show this thread -
In his later presidency, Truman always feared what would happen if you gave the military access to nukes. He thought they did not understand, as he told a number of military and AEC figures in 1948, that they were not "military weapons," but "used to wipe out women and children."pic.twitter.com/pahh9pWrmX
Show this thread -
So for me, the ultimate importance of Nagasaki is not that it was the "second" bomb used in combat. It is that it was — so far — the **last** bomb used in combat. And if we're very lucky, and very wise, it might stay that way. /THREADhttps://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/nagasaki-the-last-bomb …
Show this thread -
(NB: I realize I left off the caption for those graphs! These are from a website on "The President and the Bomb," on the history and policy of Presidential use authority, that I plan to debut by the end of the month.)pic.twitter.com/ue7pFnFHzP
Show this thread -
(For more background on the "custody" issue — in which the physical weapons were denied from the military in the early Cold War — see my writing here.)http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2012/01/30/the-custody-dispute-over-the-bomb/ …
Show this thread -
I have to run off to my own workshop now — where the Internet is unlikely to be working (sigh...) — so if you leave a lot of questions and/or angry disagreements, I won't see them until tomorrow. Just FYI!http://reinventingcivildefense.org/expo/
Show this thread
End of conversation
New conversation -
Loading seems to be taking a while.
Twitter may be over capacity or experiencing a momentary hiccup. Try again or visit Twitter Status for more information.