Obviously these folks couldn't predict the future. And if the bombs COULD end the war prior to an invasion — sure, that's a benefit. But if you buy into the "bomb or invade" framework, you're already prejudicing the results, and repeating a myth.
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4. Lastly — the reason to focus on the high-level discussions (which did, at times, explicitly reference popular opinion) is because these people made the decisions. It is important to focus on which decisions were made, and which were not, which is part of my overall point.
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Decisions not made by Truman: whether or not to use the bomb. That was already in motion, clearly, and there was no question by anyone that Truman would intervene. Unsurprisingly, he didn't. The focus on that "decision" is, historians have known for a long time now, misplaced.
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Decisions actually made by Truman: 1. Whether to tell Stalin much about the bomb (no). 2. Whether to modify unconditional surrender (no). 3. Whether the city of Kyoto should be bombed (no). 4. Whether to continue bombing after Nagasaki (no).
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And I appreciate the constructive engagement here. My core point is that we have to resist the temptation to frame this in chessboard terms. There was history, old & recent, at work, & visceral reactions that were hardly irrational.
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I'm not trying to frame it in chessboard terms, to be sure, but I would argue much more of it was non-rational (as opposed to irrational) than either the "orthodox" or "revisionist" versions acknowledge. It's messy. Some things were conscious decisions and many things were not.
End of conversation
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