Alex WellersteinVerified account

But as many historians have documented, that WASN'T how any American policymakers saw it in July 1945. Their plan was bomb AND invade. Several top-level people (Groves made it very explicit) thought it would take upwards of EIGHT atomic bombs to end the war.

Obviously these folks couldn't predict the future. And if the bombs COULD end the war prior to an invasion — sure, that's a benefit. But if you buy into the "bomb or invade" framework, you're already prejudicing the results, and repeating a myth.

There were MANY reasons that US policymakers saw dropping the bombs as beneficial to US interests. (Real human beings, of course, can have multiple motivations, and many people were involved in this work, and so many motivations were mixed in.)

I'm not trying to imply that these were bad motivations or good motivations, as an aside. Even the one that is often trotted out as the "bad" motivation (show the Soviets who is boss, which Byrnes definitely expressed), is, as part of other motivations, not necessarily terrible.

Separately, the goal of my Tweetstorm was to emphasize instead of seeing it as "bomb versus invade," the real question is "bomb 2 cities with 2 bombs in 3 days versus a lot of possibilities." The *specifics* of what occurred were not dictated by strategy, and

those specifics matter in terms of human impact, perception, etc. (The thread is not really about whether the bombs should have been dropped, but contextualizing historical discussions about whether the *second bomb* in particular was strictly necessary, etc.)

And not (to reiterate) because I think that one or the other was better, but rather to stimulate historical engagement beyond the simple "should they have dropped the bomb" story that most people know, which utterly lacks important nuance and is misleading.