18. Finally, histories that focus narrowly on what was said in the high chambers of US and Japanese policymakers take an unduly cramped view, especially given American democracy. Truman didn't just have strategic decisions to make, he had life and death choices to justify.
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Obviously these folks couldn't predict the future. And if the bombs COULD end the war prior to an invasion — sure, that's a benefit. But if you buy into the "bomb or invade" framework, you're already prejudicing the results, and repeating a myth.
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See, this part is where the indeterminacy comes in. Nobody knew what it would take for Japan to surrender. At best it was an educated guess. So at every juncture, the decision to press with every available tool was weighed against not knowing what straw would finally break them.
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I agree. But realize that you're already moving away from the "we had to use the bomb because we knew it would end the war before invasion" version of the story by acknowledging this. :-)
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I’m not moving away from “this or invasion” because of the, you know, plans for invasion. Even some of the critical historians on this argue that Truman overestimated the costs, but it wasn’t post-facto rationalization.
End of conversation
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