17. By some counts, the Red Army raped about 2 million women in Germany and triggered a colossal refugee crisis. It's not an inconsiderable humanitarian thought to avoid a replay of that in the East.
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But as many historians have documented, that WASN'T how any American policymakers saw it in July 1945. Their plan was bomb AND invade. Several top-level people (Groves made it very explicit) thought it would take upwards of EIGHT atomic bombs to end the war.
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Obviously these folks couldn't predict the future. And if the bombs COULD end the war prior to an invasion — sure, that's a benefit. But if you buy into the "bomb or invade" framework, you're already prejudicing the results, and repeating a myth.
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See, this part is where the indeterminacy comes in. Nobody knew what it would take for Japan to surrender. At best it was an educated guess. So at every juncture, the decision to press with every available tool was weighed against not knowing what straw would finally break them.
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I agree. But realize that you're already moving away from the "we had to use the bomb because we knew it would end the war before invasion" version of the story by acknowledging this. :-)
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I’m not moving away from “this or invasion” because of the, you know, plans for invasion. Even some of the critical historians on this argue that Truman overestimated the costs, but it wasn’t post-facto rationalization.
End of conversation
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