Back in Moscow, the Soviets had just granted the Japanese ambassador a long-desired meeting with Molotov. Molotov immediately handed him a declaration of war, saying it started "tomorrow." But he was used a different time zone for "tomorrow," so it started in a few hours. Tricky!
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2) On Nagasaki: almost all focus, rhetorical and strategic, was put on the first use of the bomb. (Which makes a lot of sense.) All discussions were about that. Practically none were about later bombs. There was only one point when Truman asked about the schedule of future bombs—
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...and as far as I can tell, this is the telegram he was shown, by Stimson. You'll notice it assumes the reader understands there are two types of bomb — the tested type, and the untested type. I am not sure Truman totally understood this.pic.twitter.com/3e3DSVgBgO
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In any case — Truman was not kept abreast of the second bomb. For the first bomb, he was updated as progress went forward. For the second bomb, things moved without his really being part of it. And to be fair, it was a pretty busy time: he had just arrived back in DC on August 7.
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The strike order that Truman had seen basically left all future bombing decisions up to the Army. I don't think Truman quite understood the implications of that; on August 10th, he basically rescinded it, and reserved the power for himself.pic.twitter.com/8Pv1kNblZe
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