Another fact that plays into it is that he felt that softening the previously expressed "unconditional surrender" demand and cracking the door to negotiations would embolden Japan's militarists to think America was war weary and they could get a better deal by holding out.
-
Some people think I'm curating an anti-bomb case, some people think I'm curating a pro-bomb case. I don't know; it's no-win territory. (I call myself an "inverse moderate" — I think everybody's a bit wrong.) I would prefer everyone to say, "this is pretty complicated."
I do think that the prevalence of the "orthodox" narrative — with its huge omissions — leads to the perception that anything more "comprehensive" about the decisions starts to look "anti-bomb." But that's an artifact of people's expectations.
-
-
To maybe put it another way: I'm certainly, in this Tweet storm, trying to dislodge the firmness of the "obviously pro-bomb" case. I'm not trying to nudge it into the "obviously anti-bomb" case, but rather put it in some kind of center-ground: "lots of stuff to think about."
-
I try to make very clear I don't think there are easy answers here, though I also state the areas where I do have some views (e.g., the need to think about Hiroshima and Nagasaki separately as questions of propriety, and not lump them).
End of conversation
New conversation -
Loading seems to be taking a while.
Twitter may be over capacity or experiencing a momentary hiccup. Try again or visit Twitter Status for more information.