I think one thing too often overlooked is that Hiroshima came after six years of war (if you star counting in Sept. 1939) in which, at a minimum, 40 million people had died, half of them civilians. (True count probably more like 60 million.)
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Replying to @slothce @wellerstein
Dresden and Hamburg had been destroyed in firestorms that killed tens of thousands. All sorts of horrors had happened, especially in Eastern Europe and China. That level of killing has got to inure you to the prospect of leveling a Japanese city or two in order to end the war.
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Replying to @slothce @wellerstein
Pointing to supposed Japanese interest in a negotiated settlement ignores the lesson drawn from Germany. The Nazis fought to the bitter end, long after they knew the war was lost. Some German leaders still fantasized making peace with the allies & then jointly taking on the USSR
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Replying to @slothce @wellerstein
The lesson policy makers would have drawn from Germany’s end was that it was likely Japan would also fight on, at the cost of millions more dead without some enormous “shock” like an A-bomb.
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Replying to @slothce @wellerstein
Truman said the American people would not understand or forgive him if he had the chance to save the lives of millions of American boys by dropping the bomb and didn’t take it. I see no reason not to believe that’s what he truly thought.
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Replying to @slothce
The narrative of saving lives (and "millions" is an overstatement by Truman) did not arise until well after the fact. Not how they talked about it at the time. It is very important (and tricky) to sort out the after-the-fact justifications from motivations at time.
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Replying to @wellerstein @slothce
And on parallels to Germany — the policy experts and folks who had Truman's ear were keen to emphasize that Japan was *not* Germany. Very different considerations, militarily, diplomatic, politically, and culturally. They were very aware of this, for all their faults.
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Replying to @wellerstein @slothce
On the question of "did the previous slaughter mean they didn't think the atomic bomb was anything new" — it's clear that Stimson and even Truman DID think it was something new, something that needed to be considered separately from conventional bombing.
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Replying to @wellerstein @slothce
You and I could argue about whether it was or not — there are pros and cons to each approach — but I think it's important to note the historical actors did think it was something "out of the ordinary."
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Replying to @wellerstein @slothce
But beyond that — it is worth noting that Stimson in particular, the Secretary of War, thought even the firebombings were morally problematic. He warned Truman that the US would gain the reputation of outdoing Hitler in atrocities if they did hold back in that area.pic.twitter.com/4svAmCkI7J
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Which I only point out to push back a little against the narrative of, "oh, at that time, people were totally inured to the idea that killing civilians en masse with bombs." Some people were (Curtis LeMay, for example), but some very highly-ranked people were not (e.g. Stimson).
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Replying to @wellerstein @slothce
Sorting out historical attitudes is very tricky. Even Truman lamented killing "all those kids." He would in December 1945 call the atomic bomb "the most terrible of all destructive forces for the wholesale slaughter of human beings."pic.twitter.com/gFQNRIJixC
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