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The narrative of saving lives (and "millions" is an overstatement by Truman) did not arise until well after the fact. Not how they talked about it at the time. It is very important (and tricky) to sort out the after-the-fact justifications from motivations at time.
And on parallels to Germany — the policy experts and folks who had Truman's ear were keen to emphasize that Japan was *not* Germany. Very different considerations, militarily, diplomatic, politically, and culturally. They were very aware of this, for all their faults.
On the question of "did the previous slaughter mean they didn't think the atomic bomb was anything new" — it's clear that Stimson and even Truman DID think it was something new, something that needed to be considered separately from conventional bombing.
You and I could argue about whether it was or not — there are pros and cons to each approach — but I think it's important to note the historical actors did think it was something "out of the ordinary."
But beyond that — it is worth noting that Stimson in particular, the Secretary of War, thought even the firebombings were morally problematic. He warned Truman that the US would gain the reputation of outdoing Hitler in atrocities if they did hold back in that area.pic.twitter.com/4svAmCkI7J
Which I only point out to push back a little against the narrative of, "oh, at that time, people were totally inured to the idea that killing civilians en masse with bombs." Some people were (Curtis LeMay, for example), but some very highly-ranked people were not (e.g. Stimson).
Sorting out historical attitudes is very tricky. Even Truman lamented killing "all those kids." He would in December 1945 call the atomic bomb "the most terrible of all destructive forces for the wholesale slaughter of human beings."pic.twitter.com/gFQNRIJixC
That’s kind of an odd conclusion to draw after the fight-to-the-last-man experience of Iwo Jima and Okinawa.
The American Joint Chiefs were super divided on whether Iwo Jima and Okinawa were actually representative in any way, and argued with each other (in front of Truman) about this. As an aside. But the general point, that Germany was not Japan, again, is true, and was understood.
One small thing: nothing lends to historical error so much as saying "they should have understood X." I mean, maybe that's true. But *did they* understand X? That's a research question.
One thing that is almost always true: people in the past tended to see themselves, and their time, and their options, WAY differently than we people of the future do. The job of a historian, in part, is to really try and resurrect those lost ways of seeing things. It's hard!
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