Contrary to the notion that the Japanese high command was fanatically ignorant of this, they were not. They understood the war was not going in their favor, and they had no real pretensions of "winning." The question for them was: what to do about it? How to avoid losing it all?
Only so much one can say in a million tweets. ;-) But yes, there were some (part of the same "peace" clique) who saw things this way. They were playing a delicate game between the militarists and their own cabinet politics, trying to find a way out.
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So to me it seems like the conclusion to take from this is that the incoherence of Japanese internal politics, and the sheer amorality and indifference to Japanese life of Japan's own political elite, were the outstanding problems in 1945 (and 1941 and 1937 and 1931 and,...)
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