Alex WellersteinVerified account

And the delegations are given a few options in how they construct their treaty that reflect some of the issues of 1968, e.g., Does basing of weapons in a foreign nation count as proliferation? What do the non-nuclear countries get in exchange for signing? Etc.

Anyway, things are weighted (in the "secret" memos to the delegation) so that MOST of the time the end result is pretty similar to the final NPT — it is one of the possible ways to reconcile enough of the different requirements to get a majority vote.

But there are deliberately some choices that, if they align in the right way, can produce a different treaty. And if that happens, then often things (again, deliberately) will go off the rails — e.g., the US won't be able to sign it, which triggers the USSR to not sign it.

At the end of the exercise, we have a "debriefing" where we talk about how it went and how it compared to the actual history. And when it goes off the rails, the students often want to know how "realistic" a possibility that would have been.

And the answer is simple: pretty realistic! In fact, it is what happened *every other time* a similar treaty was proposed, prior to 1968 (Ireland started pushing for a treaty of this sort over a decade before). There was nothing fated about what happened in 1968.

Such is the nature of treaties and diplomacy. After the fact it is easy to say, "of course it had to work out that way." But in reality these things are always tetchy at the time. And hardly obviously successful from the first day.

The students always rate it highly in their evals. Not just because they are not taking a test, I think, but because it gives them a first-hand glimpse into how tricky diplomacy is, how contingent history is, and how even iron-clad norms take decades to really evolve.