Alex WellersteinVerified account

What to do in 53? (5/N) But we also have the bottom up evidence (case studies, some stat evidence on early warning system reliability, stat evidence on nuclear crisis episodes and what’s going on there). And that evidence points (in my reading) to high prob of deterrence failure

What to do in 53? (6/ How to reconcile? Option 1) bottom-up evidence is right and we lucked out. Top-down evidence is just what happened but no independent info; Or

What to do in 53? (7/N) Op 2: Top-down Stability means some hidden factor limits nuke war prob, so bottom-up evidence looks scary but really no risk.

What to do in 53? (8/N) I am a micro-economist. But with that on table, I just don’t see the hidden factor. Analyzing bottom-up evidence suggests to me that nuke war could easily have happened if things had been very slightly different.

What to do in 53? (9/9) So, my conclusion: deterrence failure prob high and we lucked out. It was a crazy risk to run and prev war would have been a better bet. A long reply—but a hard question! And, of course, thanks for the great NukeMap website.

So — let's put this together. You agree that applying your logic, you'd start a war that would end up killing millions preemptively, Europe trashed, etc.

(I mean, that by itself is a hell of a thing to admit. "I support preemptively killing millions of people, because I'm scared of uncertainty." That's... something to examine a little more. Another time, perhaps.)

How's that better than an unstable deterrence that bought *time*? Time that, in the end, led to the regime in question (the USSR) collapsing? Time that allowed for a wide variety of diplomatic negotiations, shifting alliances, and so on?