What to do in 53? (3/N) But I admit that there is a tension between the top down estimate of deterrence stability (no nuke exchange during Cold War) and the bottom-up—all of the what look like (case by case) as near misses. I am going to write more about this, but briefly...
I think if your approach to DPRK's nuclear stockpile is all-or-nothing (they have to disarm now or we get a war that will kill probably hundreds of thousands of Americans AND untold numbers of Koreans, Japanese, etc.), it's a sign you haven't really adopted a nuanced view.
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And I think history gives us a lot of examples of what such nuances can look like. If you find yourself concluding, "better to kill millions today, to avoid a potential threat tomorrow" — you've gotta reexamine your values. Because that's war crime logic.
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(And if your model doesn't admit such considerations... consider revising your model.)
End of conversation
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