What to do in 53? (2/N) Given deterrence instability, this makes sense: “the final report of the JCS Evaluation Board on the Bikini tests had recommended that Congress be requested to redefine “acts of aggression” to include ‘the readying of atomic weapons against us’.
How's that better than an unstable deterrence that bought *time*? Time that, in the end, led to the regime in question (the USSR) collapsing? Time that allowed for a wide variety of diplomatic negotiations, shifting alliances, and so on?
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I think if your approach to DPRK's nuclear stockpile is all-or-nothing (they have to disarm now or we get a war that will kill probably hundreds of thousands of Americans AND untold numbers of Koreans, Japanese, etc.), it's a sign you haven't really adopted a nuanced view.
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And I think history gives us a lot of examples of what such nuances can look like. If you find yourself concluding, "better to kill millions today, to avoid a potential threat tomorrow" — you've gotta reexamine your values. Because that's war crime logic.
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(And if your model doesn't admit such considerations... consider revising your model.)
End of conversation
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