I have about 100 different private keys that were released to the public in Android apps and were also used to obtain at least 1 certificate from a CA participating in the CT project. Would it be appropriate to contact each of the respective CAs to have the certificates revoked?
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Replying to @wdormann @Scott_Helme
yes, absolutely. Please do. And send a report to the mozilla list. (Also "participating in the CT project" is these days practically every CA in the Web PKI - otherwise Chrome won't like your certs)
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Replying to @hanno @Scott_Helme
Before I reinvent any wheels, are there already any tools that can help automate the reporting of compromised keys to respective CAs? That is, given a key present in either https://crt.sh/?q= (certificate hash) https://crt.sh/?spkisha256= (key hash) show the proper contact info.
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Dump them on Twitter and tag the respective CAs. The certs are already compromised. Public disclosure would surely be the fastest way to get them revoked.
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This would still require a mapping from CA to twitter handle. I currently have a list of 38 different CAs that need to be contacted in some way.
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Ah, ok. I guess you can use Twitter for CAs that you can find on Twitter, and mozilla-dev-security-policy for the rest. There should definitely be more standardization regarding key revocation.
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Right. Given a pile of about 100 compromised keys that were issued by 38 different CAs, how would you automate the revocation process? Automation being important so as to be scalable. e.g. what if it were 1000 CAs?
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The CA/B forum baseline requirements should require that every CA registers an automated certificate revocation endpoint that takes cert keypairs as input. Are there any standardization efforts working towards something like this?
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Yeah, 1000 was an exaggeration. The actual number of underlying CA contacts is a smaller subset of the http://crt.sh caid IDs. Looks like I'll be constructing this list manually... :-/pic.twitter.com/gHTB3sbW3X
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