Recent research in cognitive research suggests this is the case. See Noah Goodman's "Probabilistic Models of Cognition" book http://probmods.org/ , and for an example read "Optimal Predictions in Everyday Cognition" http://cocosci.princeton.edu/tom/papers/predictions.pdf …
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Replying to @wcrichton @ctbeiser
Actually it’s worth qualifying this comment. These results suggest people are Bayesian in that they hold probabilistic beliefs that get updated with evidence. However, people don’t explicitly estimate likelihoods or reason about distributions.
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Replying to @wcrichton @ctbeiser
Will Crichton Retweeted Will Crichton
Instead, evidence suggests that people can only sample from their belief distributions. See refs on the “sampling hypothesis”https://mobile.twitter.com/wcrichton/status/1080655291857932288 …
Will Crichton added,
Will Crichton @wcrichtonThe "sampling hypothesis" is a fascinating psychological phenomenon: people exhibit Bayesian behaviors (updating beliefs about uncertain knowledge with observations), but can only access samples from their internalized distributions, not the distribution itself. pic.twitter.com/zPaX8VEaqGShow this thread0 replies 0 retweets 0 likes -
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For sure. The precise neural mechanism is unclear. I think the research primarily says “if you built a Bayes net to solve a problem and asked humans to solve the same, their behavior is observationally equivalent.”
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You might be interested in some of the refs from Noah’s course Computation and Cognition. I took it last quarter and really enjoyed it! https://cocolab.stanford.edu/psych204-fall2018.html …
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cognitive psychology. PhD