Will Quinn

The traditional U.S. interpretation of the atomic bombings after WWII framed them as a tragic necessity to end the war and forestall the casualties of an invasion of Japan. Truman's memoirs developed this point as did many "orthodox" historians.https://amzn.to/3oo5oxZ 

Gar Alperovitz offered the first major broadside with ATOMIC DIPLOMACY (1965), which argued that the bomb was used to intimidate the Soviets as the Japanese on the verge of surrender. It drew heavily on the U.S. decisions around the Potsdam Conference.https://amzn.to/3n8NfoO 

To illustrate just a few entries, drawing on J. Samuel Walker's historiographical essay, there was Ronald Takaki's HIROSHIMA (1995) which emphasized the role of racism in the targeting of Japan. (This drew counterarguments about area bombing in Germany.)https://amzn.to/3n811YF 

There was also Barton Berstein's "A Post-War Myth" (1986), which argued that the military estimates for U.S. deaths were far lower than the hundreds of thousands cited by Truman: 46,000 to be precise.https://bit.ly/30fdwJu 

Robert Maddox's WEAPONS FOR VICTORY (1995) argued that while parts of the Japanese gov't had put out peace feelers, the intent was neither clear to the U.S., nor made directly rather than via the Soviets, nor willing to accept essential U.S. terms.https://amzn.to/3quZq19 

Edward J. Drea's MACARTHUR'S ULTRA (1992) used allied code-breaking to show that the "46,000 U.S. deaths estimate" was outmoded quickly. The costs might have been inflated, but the Japanese were building up for a major defense for the autumn of 1945.https://amzn.to/3Hexy7f 

D.M. Giangreco's HELL TO PAY (2009) argued that a review of War Department records, as well as President Hoover's study on the subject for the government, showed massive casualty estimates as well.https://amzn.to/3kqpruv 

Richard Frank's DOWNFALL (1999) used Japanese documents to show that the Japanese gov't was nowhere near surrendering prior to Hiroshima -- though the U.S. KIA and casualty estimates were overblown.https://amzn.to/3wB3I84 

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa's RACING THE ENEMY (2005) used U.S., Soviet, and Japanese archives to argue that it was the two-punch combination of the Soviet moves towards Manchuria and Hiroshima which led Japan to surrender -- a complex argument.https://amzn.to/3D8bA3j 

John Dower's CULTURES OF WAR (2010) argued that Truman was acutely sensitive to new battlefield losses as the war wound down on other fronts and that these would have been unacceptable to him and the public given that the bomb was available.https://amzn.to/3c6dkye 

Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko's THE ATOMIC BOMB AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR (2008) argued that Hiroshima was intended to end the war, Nagasaki to keep the Soviets from invading Manchuria and threatening U.S. interests in Asia.https://amzn.to/3wR0gGR 

Wilson Miscamble's FROM ROOSEVELT TO TRUMAN (2007) argued that Truman wanted to save *American* lives, whatever the cost, since those were his special obligation. Casualty estimates were irrelevant.https://amzn.to/3wB4xhg 

Andrew J. Rotter's THE WORLD'S BOMB (2008) argued that Truman's motivations were to save U.S. lives, whatever the number, and the it was highly unlikely the Emperor could have convinced a fractured cabinet to surrender without the bomb or Soviet entry.https://amzn.to/3qqR3Ul 

Marc Gallicchio's UNCONDITIONAL (2020) framed the debate in both Japan and the U.S. over how to end the war as fractured and polarized for domestic political purposes -- and how many of those arguments live on today.https://amzn.to/3qvNxrB 

Again, props to J. Samuel Walker for his historiographical essay in AMERICA IN THE WORLD (2014) which provides pithy summaries of these debates and the factual points on which they turn.https://amzn.to/3wHeEBo