My latest article at on Ukraine, Russia, "humiliation," and the uses of history -- specifically, how we misremember the "lessons" of the Treaty of Versailles.
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Will Quinn
@wc_quinn
Former SASC PSM for . Historian of U.S. foreign policy. Adjunct researcher . Pre-Doc Fellow . Co-host of
Washington, DCJoined January 2016
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Yes, I would love to see much more progress on munitions, distributed/hardened basing, security assistance to partners, air/sea lift,and advanced capabilities. But it’s not as if *nothing* is happening. Specifics matter more (and should be the basis for debate) rather than vibes.
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And, I should add per the Tweet below, the picture is not one of unmitigated disaster or lack of attention to the Indo-Pacific, even if some long-standing issues need to be addressed. Details matter.
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Replying to @wc_quinn
Also like we just announced the expansion of Marine Littoral Battalion across the Ryukuku Islands by 2025 and joint bases in northern Luzon! We are definitely paying attention to the Indo-Pacific
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I take the question of tradeoffs over time and the deficits in the Indo-Pacific seriously, and it deserves more thoughtful exploration and discussion. /fin
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There obviously are tradeoffs — especially over time — in U.S. security assistance, posture, and investments across geographic theaters and those deserve serious discussion premised on analysis of the facts at hand, not sweeping (if not questionable and fact-free) assertions. 5/
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Third, while there are significant military deficits that need to be shored up in the Indo-Pacific region to deter the PRC and we are behind where we should be, deterrence is more complicated than this binary suggests — demonstrating cohesion and efficacy elsewhere matter. 4/
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Second, there’s the characterization of PRC leadership seeing the U.S. being “tied down” in Ukraine (which it is isn’t) and “giving into temptation” by going to war (presumably over Taiwan). But that isn’t going to be snap decision as implied. 3/
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First, there are broad assertions of the U.S. being “tied down” without any effort to contextualize the support provided vs. what the U.S. has elsewhere. The actual military details — production lines, stockpiles, capabilities, capacity, posture — matter more than “vibes.” 2/
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This critique of U.S. defense policy vis-a-vis Ukraine, Russia, and China errs in several ways. 1/
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People keep saying that “fighting Russia is the way to fight China.”
Completely wrong.
The day the Chinese see that America is up to its neck in Ukraine with no hope of pulling out or diverting resources—
That’s the day China will give in to temptation and go to war.
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Are you an early career diplomatic or military historian? If so please respond to this tweet
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Thread. Should be core issue.
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I would like to read a piece that enumerates how dramatically reduced Russian military capacity due to the war in Ukraine should effect U.S. posture in Europe with an eye towards the Western Pacific and a Taiwan Strait scenario. 1/
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Good thoughts and analysis here about our policy toward #China as it could relate to our interests in Europe since the start of the #RussianUkrainianWar
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I would like to read a piece that enumerates how dramatically reduced Russian military capacity due to the war in Ukraine should effect U.S. posture in Europe with an eye towards the Western Pacific and a Taiwan Strait scenario. 1/
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Smart, refreshingly nuanced thread from friend & colleague
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I would like to read a piece that enumerates how dramatically reduced Russian military capacity due to the war in Ukraine should effect U.S. posture in Europe with an eye towards the Western Pacific and a Taiwan Strait scenario. 1/
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Replying to
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Such analysis would be predicated on assumptions that may be upended, but it's the kind of analysis that could focus on requirements, capabilities, and industrial capacity rather than abstract arguments based on geography and slippery slope logic. /fin
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Given magnitude of the China challenge in military terms alone, it would therefore be good to see analysis on what a shift in the balance of forces in Europe might mean in practical terms -- should the trends of the past six months or so continue. 8/
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What does interest me, however, is where the rubber meets the road. It is obviously too early to see precisely how the war will play out in Ukraine but it has dramatically changed European security and created a potential opportunity for U.S. defense posture and planning. 7/
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At the end of the day, I'm agnostic on whether we have good insight into how either signal affects Beijing's views or supports deterrence per se, so I'm loath to go all in on the sharpest version of either position. 6/
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The other camp, however, downplays material costs and serious gaps across theaters in favor of "sending Beijing a message" by supporting Ukraine and degrading Russian military capacity with little vision or articulation about what should come next. 5/
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What enhances deterrence more on the margin, a handful of FMS cases to Taiwan and some temporary deployments to the Indo-Pacific or demonstrating the ability to deliver debilitating blows against a rival over time while maintaining alliance cohesion? 4/
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One camp insists that any provision of assistance and commitment of resources to Europe rather than the Indo-Pacific with a focus on a Taiwan scenario will produce a zero-sum cost to the effort to deter China. Yet this ignores questions of probability, timing, and perception. 3/
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Unfortunately, the current debate over tradeoffs in security assistance between Ukraine and Taiwan and posture in Europe vs. the Indo-Pacific in some defense circles seems overdrawn, especially when the positions of the two main camps focus what will best deter Beijing. 2/
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I would like to read a piece that enumerates how dramatically reduced Russian military capacity due to the war in Ukraine should effect U.S. posture in Europe with an eye towards the Western Pacific and a Taiwan Strait scenario. 1/
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Explaining a complex topic (understanding German decision-making) quickly and succinctly is never easy – but and the great team at always make it fun to try!
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In our interview, NSC's John Kirby cites DoD: "There are no excess tanks in the U.S. inventory, and that, even if there were, to provide them under drawdown authority... would still require months."
Our @newshour coverage, with @Zebaism @DanSagalyn
youtube.com/watch?v=ztMgw2
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🧵A few thoughts on the day the Abrams and Leopards were freed and why there are equal parts frustration and exhilaration over the decision.
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As someone who has just finished in-depth chapters on the Berlin crisis (1961) and the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), I'll just say the threat of an all-out nuclear war was then *incomparably* higher than today. So the doomsday clock has suffered a threat inflation for sure.
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The Doomsday Clock was moved to 90 seconds to midnight today, Jan. 24, the closest it's ever been.
The Doomsday Clock is a decades-long project of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists featuring a clock face where midnight represents Armageddon. usatoday.com/in-depth/news/
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Don't miss this exciting opportunity to further your study of the role of nuclear weapons in historic and contemporary settings! Applications are open until February 14, 2023. Visit sais.jhu.edu/kissinger/kiss for more details
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Applications for the Kissinger Summer Academy are open! This week-long seminar revisits historic debates, policy challenges, and explores the future role of nuclear weapons in shaping American competitions with Russia and China today.
sais.jhu.edu/kissinger/kiss
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Applications for the IPSCON Junior Scholar Cohort are currently open! Explore this amazing opportunity to bridge the gap between academia and practice. sais.jhu.edu/kissinger/ipsc
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Happy New Year! In 2023, consider joining the IPSCON; applications for the Junior Scholar Cohort are open! This program is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of NY and seeks to bridge the gap between academia and practice. sais.jhu.edu/kissinger/ipsc
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For young scholars interested in the connection between scholarship and policy, this is a brilliant program with the and !
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Applications for the IPSCON Junior Scholar Cohort are currently open! Explore this amazing opportunity to bridge the gap between academia and practice. sais.jhu.edu/kissinger/ipsc
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What is the logic behind America’s China strategy?
In a new article, the fantastic and I analyze four different schools of thought:
1) Responsible Stakeholder
2) Communist Collapse
3) Constructive Cooperation
4) Managed Competition
A short 🧵 on our findings...
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"I do not think such a process, such an educational campaign, could be carried on in time to secure results before Congress is plunged into the turmoil of the next presidential election." 5/end
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"...and when you have created such a belief in their minds, you can carry on a campaign of education which will ultimately bring out your result if you are right." 4/
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"When that has been accomplished by the Cabinet Officer, he will have success as a rule. Barring an occasional slant of personal or local interest, the committees are anxious to do what is best for the country..." 3/
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"One has to get into direct personal touch with the members of the committees having the matter in charge, and has to first convince them of the fact that he has more knowledge of the subject than they have, and next that he is sincere..." 2/
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More wit and wisdom from the Elihu Root Papers , this time on how to engage Congress and get legislation through as Secretary of War. The mileage of my old colleagues on may vary! 1/
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Fun archival find of the day in : former Secretary of State Elihu Root writing to Julia Grant, Princess Cantacuzène about emigré politics, regime change, and humanitarian aid to Russia. 1/
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Emigré political activities, particularly after 1917, would periodically erupt into scandal with revelations of active measures from White Russians and Bolsheviks alike, as chronicled in part by . An intriguing and cautionary tale. fin/
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"...and he is at liberty to make himself the centre of the future solar system. The most cheerful consideration for the future of Russia is that most of these people are going to have very little to do with future events." 9/
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"The English emigré was constrained by the Stewart objective. The French emigrés were constrained by the Bourbon objective. The Russian emigré of today, however, has nothing definite to concentrate upon beyond the destruction of the Bolsheviki..." 8/
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