14/ This is where the analogy to 1831 breaks down. Trump = Jackson, Fallows = Tocqueville, but 1831 economy != 2018 economy.
1831 was peak Jefferson, trough Hamilton. 2018 is the exact opposite.
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15/ I laid out this thesis in my 2015 Aeon article, American Cloud. aeon.co/essays/america
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16/ This means a) that the problems at Big Sky Country level are FAR more consequential than just some discourse toxicity, and b) Little Sky Country ain't gonna save us.
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17/ The core issue here is where you think American strength truly lies: in the romanticized Tocqueville small-town yeomanry with its storied highlight moments like the homesteading movement? (Jeffersonianism)
Or the talent for scale? (Hamiltonianism)
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18/ I think the evidence of history is unequivocal. The *average* mediocre gold-rushing, land-grabbing, manifest-destinying American contributed far less to America's greatness than the Hamiltonian types who dreamed Big Sky dreams.
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Certainly, but the point is, American greatness is disproportionately a function of the work of those who succeeded. Not those who failed, and not those who didn't try, but simply joined one gold rush or the other.
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It's not. Historically, big sky dreamers require big sky support infrastructure (big government, interstates, war efforts...). The support network is all big sky too.
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Land-grant univs didn't begin to compete as important cultural capital centers and knowledge producers until after WW 2 and the rise of indirect cost support, from which most of the discretionary funding for univs is derived
