Conversation

There’s a weird tragedy of commons potential with willing-to-get-violent protests as a political action mode. Two kinds of talented leaders have an incentive to take control: those with nothing left to lose, and those with safe places to retreat to. The latter is big moral hazard
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There is almost an irresistible kind of power career available to a certain kind of politically ambitious person with high risk appetite but a personal security haven to retreat to. The leadership roles in this kind of action are a grift-entryism magnet.
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Iron Law of Protest Bureaucracies: those with a high stake in the actual cause will eventually be displaced by those with high moral hazard and grift appetite. It’s fundamental not an institutional form that can last long. The internal tensions make sustainability impossible.
Replying to
Seeing same patterns reproduce repeatedly in two very different countries makes me very cynical about such mechanisms for driving real change as opposed to advancing sociopath careers. In India grifters are typically “student leaders” in their mid-30s pwning “student” activism.
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