I’d argue the reverse. We restrict the range of civilizational activity to make more predictable phenomena more normal. Both math and science would be less useful in the wild. Civilization creates math/science unreasonable effectiveness bubbles.
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Physical laws are causation wrapped in math. But causation is the real nut. Why and how does one state of the world constrain other possible states. The nomological order of reality is a puzzle itself. Khun/Feyerabend are too cute by half. Laws are real because causation is real.
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Admittedly, I come to this through physics and philosophy, with some behavioral economics/public policy/economics excursions, so the applications of these thoughts are not much more beyond metaphor, but analogically, there is nothing incoherent about social scientific laws per se
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Replying to @hyperauxetic @Aelkus and
And about physics being a domain where phenomena can be rigorously specified: in fact, we make the same model-bound simplifications (the canonical frictionless plane) as soc sci.Models aren’t pictures of reality (a la L. Witt.) but causal isomorphisms of one part of it to itself.
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Somebody was arguing a while back about the primacy of scientific instruments— engineered tools — over science qua science, now who was it? 
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