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Ah...this is the ontological vs epistemological distinction. One can be epistemologically objective about ontologically subjective states (in other words, states of mind). I'm not lying, etc (being subjective in the first sense) if I say "I'm thinking of a cat" (if I am).
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(There I explain two forms of rational objective morality. The foundational/scientific/consequentialist kind favoured by Harris and the non-foundational problem-focussed Popperian view articulated by Deutsch. I contrast both with religious dogmatism and relativism).
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2/2: That this doesn’t happen no more undermines the fact objective morality exists than does the fact there isn’t perfect consensus on matters of science. Science isn’t a *negotiation* between scientists. 99% of scientists can disagree. 1% can be correct. So too morality.
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