It is frankly horrifying to me that some in the election systems industry continue to cling to the delusional claim that paperless voting systems aren’t vulnerable to practical attacks and software failures. Experts are unanimous that these systems are dangerous and obsolete.
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Software and hardware are *inherently* vulnerable to tampering and error. That’s why experts recommend voting systems that don’t depend on perfect, invulnerable software: paper ballots with risk limiting audits.
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The solution isn’t to make the software and hardware used in elections invulnerable. That’s an impossible goal. The solution is to use systems that don’t depend on perfect software for the integrity of the election. Fortunately, we know how to do this, today.
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How? Voter-marked paper ballots, which can be counted by computers (which might fail or be tampered with). Followed by a statistically rigorous “risk limiting audit” of the reported count that verifies any computer-counted election outcomes.
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Replying to @mattblaze
Is the reason for computer counting instead of human counting to reduce cost?
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Replying to @thijsniks
US elections are hugely complex, both in terms of number of ballot questions and number of different ballot types. Full hand counting is impractical (and likely too inaccurate in close races) at scale for most jurisdictions here. It works in some localities, but not most.
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That makes sense. Thank you!
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