People arguing that physical access to a computer means you've lost: why do you think laptops should not be at least as resistant to physical attack as an iPhone?
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But right now we're at the level where a laptop can be compromised without even having to install hardware implants - there's too many security critical components that aren't fully protected
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so where do you draw the line? should the system defend against an attacker who can glitch the memory bus, or get full temporary MITM on the memory bus? (which would probably incur almost the whole overhead of SGX) how about the disk (swap is typically encrypted without MAC)?
End of conversation
New conversation -
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if you want to defend against that scenario, it might be worth writing kernel code that, kind of similar to hibernation, clobbers or in-place encrypts everything on standby and then prompts for a passphrase on wakeup before decrypting everything again?
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