Right, but because you have to trust the vendor anyway, they don't need to make the source/seeds public. For example, they could hire an auditor to verify and you can trust them that they're telling the truth, and you get the same benefit?
I can prove it's not the case that it's harder to write a bugdoor than a backdoor: People do it accidentally without even trying all the time
Still, I only object to saying it helps prevent backdoors, maybe it improves build quality, but I'm not really sure about that.
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We might have to agree to disagree here. Writing a targeted backdoor for a specific user group and/or shipping a tampered binary to that specific group seems significantly easier to me than writing an innocent-looking bug in the global, published code base. Of course there are
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combinations of other approaches (code signing, transparency logs, paid-for auditors with public reports, etc.) that can mitigate some of these vectors. But if you can do reproducible builds for open source releases with co-signing by independent build servers, why would you not?
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