Reproducible builds make most sense together with open source, of course. And it's of value even if nobody is constantly verifying the builds. Simply the point that they could mitigates the vector of a malicious builds server. Source level backdoors are certainly not addressed.
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Replying to @rene_mobile @fugueish and
You can prove the build server isn't compromised, but you can't prove you're not trying to hide a backdoor, right? So users still have to trust you, and you could get the same benefit from getting a third party to privately repro the build for you...
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I don't fully agree. It is still easier to hide a backdoor in (obfuscated) binary code than it is in (written-to-be-maintainable) source code. Config should ideally be included. And there are other code quality benefits of reproducible builds besides security (testing, deltas).
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Replying to @rene_mobile @fugueish and
Is it easier? The benefit of bugdoors isn't ease, it's that they're plausibly deniable, if you get caught, so what? You might even be able to convince people not to talk about it for months, and you can try again in a new patch, there's zero penalty.
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Replying to @taviso @rene_mobile and
There might be non-security benefits of reproducible builds to *vendors*, but I don't see any benefit to users of being able to reproduce them. This is just because promising there's no backdoors make no sense when bugdoors are just so perfect?
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Replying to @taviso @rene_mobile and
Fwiw I see benefits in reproducible builds to answer the question "is the binary on my machine built from this source"?
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Replying to @halvarflake @taviso and
Without reproducible builds, source analysis offers zero benefit. With reproducible builds, it offers some benefit. For example, crypto bugdoors that allow mass-scale passive decryption are possible (Dual EC, Fortinet) but are also extremely rare.
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Replying to @matthew_d_green
Forgive me if this is ignorant, but is that "zero benefit against a malicious author"? With a vendor who might not be malicious, source analysis can still catch bugs, and that has some value, no?
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Replying to @hyperpape @matthew_d_green
Ah wait, I see Tavis made the same point.
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Replying to @hyperpape
Yes, if the author is non-malicious it offers a ton of benefit. If the author is malicious,
@taviso is arguing it offers no benefit. I would be inclined to agree it offers “less” benefit but maybe not zero.1 reply 0 retweets 3 likes
Yes, 100% source being available is hugely beneficial, I think we all agree on that. 
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Replying to @taviso @hyperpape
The most likely long term outcome is that firms release source that’s security critical, and keep secret source that isn’t. Right now in typical applications this doesn’t help too much with security, but it might someday.
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This would be a fascinating requirement of businesses that trade PII.
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End of conversation
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