I think today’s system is a compromise that works given its use case that is largely acceptable. I think layering the authentication and frequency requirements that would be required for escrow that would no longer be the case.
Okay, and if key escrow matched this level of risk, you would agree it's not a significant increase in attack surface? With the understanding that you believe law enforcement would want more frequency and scale that this could provide.
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Nope :) making a failure mode a healthy path has additional risks. For example the authentication, authorization and frequency changes.
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Okay, I think we just disagree then
I think the current infrastructure is less secure than you think, which weakens the argument that key escrow must meet an imagined bar... It's still an okay argument though. - 1 more reply
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