So I'm saying, it doesn't make TLS MITM untenable, it forces the vendors hand to do dangerous things. Do you want more security vendors patching around in chrome.exe? If we could prevent Administrators from MitMing endpoints, you better believe I would be hassling chrome devs 
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Replying to @taviso @SwiftOnSecurity and
The usual tricks of the sort could be used on (normal retail Chrome to make patching untenable and force those who really need MITM to weigh & absorb the costs of running a Bluecoat maintained Chromium. Reinforces difference for end-user.
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Replying to @mdhardeman @SwiftOnSecurity and
There are no "usual tricks" that make patching untenable to Administrators, if there were, we would do that. This is one of those "immutable laws of computer security".
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Replying to @taviso @SwiftOnSecurity and
That's not entirely true. It's draconian, but all sorts of DRM techniques exist for this stuff. It doesn't have to be perfect. It just has to make it painful enough and change often enough that Bluecoat, etc. can't keep up. See PC gaming...
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Replying to @taviso @SwiftOnSecurity and
I think the difference is in controlling the brand and by doing so allowing the end-user to discern a visible difference. "This is real Chrome and when I'm in this, it's not cooperating with the boss spying." "This is the work browser that I have to use so that they see."
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Replying to @mdhardeman @taviso and
Yes exactly. That kind of UX distinction is essential to teaching non-security-expert users basic safety AND to building their faith that TLS/HTTPS/encryption actually does what it's claimed to do.
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Replying to @RichFelker @mdhardeman and
Everyone thinks that, the problem is it's not possible. Why don't you just solve the halting problem Rich, that would make things much easier. Don't you care about users? Do the right thing, stop tweeting and get solving.
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Replying to @taviso @mdhardeman and
Here "not possible" is a matter of political will/marketplace influence by the browser vendors, not some underlying fundamental impossibility. Tweeting about it is a small step towards making the idea that they should do this mainstream.
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Write me a program that can safely assert something when the Administrator is malicious, it can be as simple as you like. Make it show the result of X509_verify() or something in a message box.
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Replying to @taviso @mdhardeman and
That's impossible. But what is possible is asserting "either someone committing a crime is in control of this machine, or any certificate it accepts is sufficiently legitimate that your non-backdoored phone/laptop would also accept it".
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Replying to @RichFelker @mdhardeman and
Serious question, If I told you yesterday that today you would be arguing for DRM and that Administrators don't have the right to modify software on their own computers, would you have believed me?
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