@nixcraft If you can install a local CA you can install a modified Chrome without any warnings. Chrome can't protect against it.
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This post explains why that's a nonsense argument: http://blog.okturtles.com/2015/11/dells-tumble-googles-fumble-and-how-government-sabotage-of-internet-security-works/ …
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Incidentally you can also run rm -rf on your machine and hit it with a hammer.
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Not OK to tell users they're on a secure connection when it's being MITM'd.
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Also doesn't tell you anything about WebRTC DTLS SRTP. No chromed (non-spoofable) way to check fingerprt
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No, I mean to verify end-to-end encryptn of (non-http) transport tied to an element eg call/video stream.
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Compare eg to RedPhone/Signal where there's a SAS. You can't E2E with Chrome, b/c trust is tied to site.
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"PUBLIC KEY PINNING BYPASSED BY LOCAL ROOT CERTIFICATE" wtf G doesn't employ retards; I conclude malice.
@taoeffecthttps://twitter.com/taoeffect/status/750200660272885764 …
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@CTZN5 And a (modified) version of that wording could be fine—if anyone could actually see it. -
another colour even, to specifically indicate "secure according to a local cert"
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that way if you're on a DOD site that does certs that way, you can know it's normal for that site only w/o affecting UI elsewhere
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What happened to the red x / crossed out HTTPS? *That* should be happening on a MitM connection.
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@tehCh0nG@taoeffect@ChromiumDev yeah. Seems Google thinks devs can't deploy HPKP correctly. Then why support it at all? cc@sleevi_ -
Whether they can or can't, that's got nothing to do with lying to users about the security of the conn.
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agreed. Hiding a MitM alert in devtools doesn't help anyone. Especially not the user under attack.
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