Laruelle’s mistake is to treat philosophy as a substance and to try to isolate its universal structure. Badiou tells us that philosophy is an act, and not a substance: “If philosophy is an act, there is no last philosophy” (Theory of Evil, Theory of Love, 49).
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Replying to @TPBlake
This is a misreading of Laruelle. In no way does L say that Phi is a substance. If it is an act, it is in its decisionality and its spontaneity. Philosophy qua substance has no meaning from the perspective of non-phi/non-standard phi
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Replying to @tadkins613
Of course he doesn't "say" it, it is an implicit assumption of his method. Laruelle misreads himself. He is in performative contradiction between the thesis of philosophy as act that you describe and his (structuralist) thesis of the principle of sufficient philosophy.
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Replying to @TPBlake
You mistake a critique of philosophy’s structure (this is as old as Plato) with a critique of philosophy’s operationality, which actually shows Laruelle’s indebtedness to Deleuze via Simondon’s rigorous recasting of analogy.
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Replying to @tadkins613
A principle of operationality is still structuralist, as it itself is not operational but structural. Laruelle's indebtedness to his elders goes far beyond the Simondon connection.
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I never said his indebtedness was purely Simondonian, but your conflation of structure and operation is mistaken. I am merely focusing on your singular attachment to these terms of “structure” and “substance”, which radically retranslate non-phi into manipulable concretizations.
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