wittgenstein: the difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.
borges: nothing is built on stone, everything on sand, but it is our duty to build as if sand were stone…
The idea is that, while permissioned sets require some degree of trust in a DAO, they’re much more resistant to Sybils and prevent the network from excessively relying on a given setup, jurisdiction, service provide etc.
Liquid staking is like cocaine - cant stop ppl from doing coke, but can mitigate damage widespread use might do to society. Requires healthy engagement. Make it illegal or try to suppress, you will get crack (CEX liquid staking) proliferating in vulnerable communities (retail)
interesting thread with many good points.
my main point of contention is the following:
'the problem of CEX capture is easier to mitigate and watch for than the ability to allow new entrants to a valuable system.'
there are good reasons to believe that this is simply not true
Good thread by Monet and I wanted to add some flavor on how @rocket_pool solves this issue.
Long ago Vasiliy said the end state of Lido and Rocket Pool will be very similar. He is likely still correct, however, we're approaching from polar opposites.
Whitelists for RPL twitter.com/MonetSupply/st…
I think I'm ready with the next post in the properties of money series introducing the Unit of Account, its origins, and the basic inside/outside money idea.
Thought I'd keep it short but then almost doubled its length with footnotes 😅. Hope you don't mind.
permissionlessness for the sake of permissionlessness usually leads to more single points of failure, not less
it should not be a goal in itself, but rather a natural consequence of an airtight governance design
aka, there is no laws of physics or ultimate determined rules/structures when it comes (at least) to human social coordination, only tendencies of thumb and more or less convincing aesthetics/rhetorics that define what is and isn't legitimate.
Absolutely true - Lido has to work hard on being credibly neutral. The EF also must dissolve. Until these don't happen, Ethereum's credible neutrality is not established.
the predictable end state (imo) is that cb/kraken/etc could start to run minipools, offer higher yield for users who stake directly through them vs reth, and centralize the validator pool, their cost of operations and capital will always tend to be lower than home stakers
rocketpool has no means of preventing operator or geographic concentration, and it appears that both factors are currently more concentrated than lido
seems like rocketpool has fairly difficult issues to address too but is presenting like they are in a workable end state
this is why a synthetic asset (stablecoin/lsd/etc) bearing high yield is such a fantastic countersignal - exactly the opposite of how CT flywheel threadooors portray it
ppl literally wont touch these assets unless they are paid for the excess risk - at the projects' expense
all this to say, current narrative of "whitelist bad, permissionless entry good" is a bit one dimensional
curating a healthy validator set is a difficult challenge, dont think anyone has fully wrapper their arms around it, but burying the lede with narratives is not a solution
there's obviously competitive factor at play, but imo rocketpool homies arent engaging with a key argument here
is there a risk of large centralized operators leveraging rocketpool in a way that is detrimental to reth validator set (and ethereum as a whole)?
It's so weird people consider Coinbase on oDAO as a good thing for RocketPool. Assuming the protocol is unchanged, and CEX assimilation of the protocol continues, there is only one conclusion. Exchanges will run the majority of it using custodial liquid staking of ETH and RPL.
they should list frax so they could get (check notes) a technically insolvent stable nobody is willing to hold for less than 5% with massive multisig rugpull risk kek
I think something like this would be better. You are assuming too much about the adequacy of meat space rights and the words are too vague. In reality, we need more/different rights in the digital realm than we have in meatspace.
With that said, there is still some "bad debt" risk to be aware of. Ultimately, the AMO's effectiveness interacting with the Curve pool is what will determine the protocol's ability to keep bad debt from entering the system. Let's dig into this a bit…
Nonetheless is good for frxETH users to work this information into their risk framework and understand that a big % of the ETH in the Curve pool belongs to them when it eventually comes time to request a withdraw from staking.
Spent some time yesterday considering @fraxfinance's frxETH system and wanted to share an analysis to answer the murky question of:
"is my frxETH backed 1:1 with ETH?"
while also following-up my previous tweet which regrettably sounded like a "gotchya"...
there’s a sense in which being a liquid staking optimist reduces to being a DAO optimist (in the true sense of the term).
what it boils down to is the following:
can we figure out how to décentralise power effectively (in a way which does not depend on social layer duct tape)?