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Next, we have the statement of the issues, which was supposed to be found two sections prior to the summary of the argument.

Had this section been placed where it was supposed to be, it would have been even easier to notice that the summary of the argument fails to address all of them.

The District Court lacked jurisdiction to award inherentauthority
and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions to Defendants based on
a post-dismissal motion.
II. The District Court abused its discretion in awarding the
maximum possible sanctions to punish an argument it dislikes.
A. Appellants made non-frivolous factual assertions based
on sworn statements and under the emergency
circumstances that triggered this litigation.
B. Appellants brought non-frivolous legal claims based on
a reasonable interpretation of the law and plausible
arguments to extend the law.
C. The District Court abused its discretion by awarding to
Detroit, a permissive intervenor, nearly 700% of the
sanctions awarded to the actual Defendants.

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The District Court erred as a matter of law by violating the
First Amendment rights of Appellants and their clients.
Case: 21-1786 Document: 22 Filed: 02/07/2022 Page: 19
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IV. The District Court erred as a matter of law by issuing a
sanctions order with no effort to tie specific findings of
sanctionable conduct to a specific standard and specific remedy
V. The District Court erred as a matter of law by imposing
sanctions collectively against all attorneys without explaining its
individualized consideration of their relative responsibility for any
misconduct.

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The District Court erred as a matter of law by ignoring Rule
11’s safe-harbor provision and using inapplicable supplemental
sources of sanctions authority to fill the gap.

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105

Also, the "we substantially complied with the Rule 11 safe harbor" argument is substantially stupid, but we'll get to that later.

109

And there's other dumbness in there, but I think we can catch that as we go through the argument itself.

Next, statement of the case. It should be: "a concise statement of the case setting out the facts relevant to the issues submitted for review, describing the relevant procedural history, and identifying the rulings presented for review, with appropriate references to the record."

So now you know what it won't be.

119

1: Intervenor Davis can fairly be characterized as "a gadfly serial litigant." 2: Using that phrase in a brief like this is SERIOUSLY POOR FORM. 3: Doing so without explaining who he is and why you call him that is *stupid* AND in poor form.

Plaintiffs are three registered Michigan voters nominated to serve
as Republican Presidential Electors on behalf of the State of Michigan
and three others who served as the chairpersons of their respective
counties’ chapters of the Republican Party, which is charged under
state law with selecting electors. RE 6, Page ID # 882-83. Plaintiffs
sued Defendant Gretchen Whitmer in her official capacity as Governor
of Michigan, Jocelyn Benson in her official capacity as Michigan
Case: 21-1786 Document: 22 Filed: 02/07/2022 Page: 20
12
Secretary of State, and the Michigan Board of State Canvassers.2 Id.
During the first week of litigation, the City of Detroit (RE 5), the
Democratic National Committee and Michigan Democratic Party (RE
14), and a gadfly serial litigant (RE 12) each moved for leave to
intervene. Each was granted leave, though without a specification
whether leave was as of right or permissive, except as to the serial
litigant, who was granted permissive leave. RE 28, Page ID # 21

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118

I'm going to mostly skim this section, but I'll highlight a few points. Like this one: Never put that first sentence in any brief. But VERY do not put that sentence in a MASSIVELY OVERLENGTH brief.

This is the unfortunate case where dates do matter, and so
Appellants are compelled to include them, even though they never make
a brief more readable. Five days after adding the Intervenors, on
December 7, 2020, the District Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for
injunctive relief. RE 62, Page ID # 3296. Plaintiffs then sought
appellate review and certiorari, the latter filed on December 11.3

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129

OHNOnononononono... DON'T OBFUSCATE KEY FACTS. EVER EVER EVEREVEREVER.

119

OK. Here's the offending paragraph. (Well, *an* offending paragraph anyway.) See the numbers? How everything's cited to RE 172, Page ID #6900-01? Those aren't the actual documents they're referring to. So what are they trying to hide?

Rule 11’s safe-harbor provision gave Plaintiffs until January 5,
2021, to respond to Detroit’s December 15, 2020, letter, Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(c)(2). RE 172, Page ID # 6900. Plaintiffs timely moved for an
extension to respond to the sanctions motion, which the District Court
granted until January 19, 2021. Id. Plaintiffs also successfully moved
for more time, until January 19, 2021, to respond to the motions to
dismiss. Id. at 6901.

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7:50 PM · Feb 8, 2022

As it turns out, they're trying to hide quite a lot. Lying to the court is bad, Howard, m'kay? Lying to the court in the appeal of a sanctions motion is REALLY bad, Howard. Do you understand why that might be?

191

I don't throw the word "lying" around lightly. But while Sidney and Teh Klown are crazy and stupid, they're not crazy and stupid enough for this to be accidental. They're actively attempting to mislead the court.

159

Their argument is that they "substantially complied" with the Rule 11 safe harbor. (Whatever that means.) To make that work, they've got to show that they dismissed the case in a timely manner. Now look at their description of events.

101

"Rule 11’s safe-harbor provision gave Plaintiffs until January 5, 2021, to respond to Detroit’s December 15, 2020, letter...Plaintiffs timely moved for an extension to respond to the sanctions motion, which the District Court granted until January 19, 2021."

This is clearly intended to suggest that they dealt with the Rule 11 letter in a timely manner. Thing is, the sanctions motion they got the extension on was a *different* sanctions motion. And they didn't successfully file a motion for extension until 12 Jan 21.

118

That's a week *AFTER* their deadline to deal with the Rule 11 letter in a timely manner. And a week after the motion for sanctions under Rule 11 was filed. That paragraph is carefully drafted to obfuscate those inconvenient facts, and imply that they had permission to delay.

146

That's not an honest approach to the issue by any stretch of the imagination. Not good, Howard. Not good at all.

126

OK. The rest of the section is disorganized and rambly, and I'm going to skim past to get to the argument.

Howard, what the beer-battered, deep-fried, extra-crispy fuck are you even doing here?

152

The word "argument" contains a footnote call which goes to a footnote that appears to contain substantive argument - of a kind never presented to the trial court. What the literal hell? I do not comprehend the derangement of thought that could lead to this.

ARGUMENT5
I. The District Court abused its discretion in awarding
sanctions to punish an argument it dislikes.
5 While Cooter & Gell supports jurisdiction to entertain a post-dismissal
Rule 11 sanctions motion, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in that case—
which focused on “Rule 11’s language and purposes”—has no
application to inherent-authority or Section 1927 sanctions. 496 U.S. at
394-95. Because the authority to impose sanctions is penal in nature, it
must be strictly construed. E.g., United States v. Ross, 535 F.2d 346,
350 (6th Cir. 1976). This is particularly true of inherent-authority
sanctions, which are “shielded from direct democratic controls, [and]
must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Roadway Exp., Inc. v.
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980). The rule is that jurisdiction to wield
strictly-construed powers must be construed narrowly. See Goldstein v.
Cox, 396 U.S. 471, 477–478 (1970) (28 U.S.C. § 1253 jurisdiction);
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100,

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120

As for the argument, I know why it's made. It was key to the successful denial of the sanctions motion in the Wisconsin Trump case. But that case was under 7th Cir law, and their competent professional responsibility counsel didn't argue this in front of the district court.

104

They're arguing that this was a jurisdictional failure, so *maybe* the failure to argue it below might not be fatal. But burying it in a footnote disconnected from everything else might be.

Yeah, the entire strategy for this document is to kilotuple down. They've probably decided to not bother with a real effort at arguing the appeal; this is intended purely to help them continue to fleece their rubes.

The District Court evidently does not think much of the millions of
Americans,6 hundreds of legislators,7 and dozens of affiants in this case
who share Plaintiffs’ concerns about election integrity. If that were the
end of it, Appellants would have no cause to complain. But the District
Court gave its personal opinions the weight of punitive government
sanction. Its discussions are one-sided—citing only those who agree
with its preferences, and wholly ignoring huge parts of the record that

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109

Credit where due, the final sentence isn't bad as a standalone sentence in a brief. Although I certainly wouldn't have capitalized the first letter after the colon here.

contradict its conclusions. Its analysis mixes standards and relies on
inapplicable authorities. Its order deploys a censorious, accusatory
tone, contriving misconduct where there was clearly none. E.g., infra
n.56. The District Court’s sanctions order is an outlier for a reason: It
is an abuse of discretion.

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For your convenience, I've highlighted their use of an on-point citation in a key, make-or-break argument.

A. Appellants made non-frivolous factual assertions based
on sworn statements and under the emergency
circumstances that triggered this litigation.
1. Attorneys cannot be sanctioned for relying on
affidavits they did not know to be untrue,
particularly in a fast-paced election case.
Attorneys—like Michigan elections officials, Mich. Comp. L. §§
168.523(2), 168.558(2)—are entitled to rely on the sworn affidavits of
witnesses. Attorneys are also entitled to rely on their clients, who in
this case were persons experienced in Michigan elections, namely,
Michigan state party officials and the presidential electors they
selected. Indeed, given that “[v]erification is the exception rather than
the rule in federal civil practice,” attorneys are not required to have any
evidence—sworn or otherwise—beyond a client’s say-so before bringing
suit. WRIGHT & MILLER, 5A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1339 Verification
(4th ed. West 2022).

(Blank space highlighted)

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125

Seriously, the entire key question here is whether, under Rule 11, they could simply rely on a sworn statement or if they had a duty to investigate further. They need a citation to an authority that says they have no such duty.

114

They need that for many reasons, their clear duty to investigate further not least amongst them.

OK. This is better. Unfortunately for Sidney and Teh Klown, it's not truly on point. Each of these citations deals with *the client's* sworn testimony. It does not deal with *witness* testimony, and particularly not with the testimony of alleged experts.

Addressing a motion for sanctions, Judge McMahon wrote: “I was
once a practicing lawyer, and if my client came to me and told me he
owned a patent, and showed me that the patent was registered to him
at the PTO, I doubt very much whether I would have undertaken an
extensive title search; lawyers are entitled to rely on their clients in
such matters.” Advanced Video Techs. LLC v. HTC Corp., No. 1:11 CIV.
06604 (CM), 2015 WL 7621483, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2015), aff'd,
677 F. App’x 684 (Fed. Cir. 2017). That is the consensus view of
experienced federal judges. E.g., Lucas v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc.,
217 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1205-06 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (“[A]n attorney is
entitled to rely on his client’s sworn testimony, as outlandish as the
twelve-suit story sounded ....”).8 It is also the law of this Circuit. In re

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In re Amodeo, No. 8:17-BK-07965-RCT, 2019 WL 10734046 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. July 30, 2019) (bankruptcy trustee entitled to rely on debtor’s
statement); United States v. Allmendinger, No. 3:10CR248, 2017 WL
455553 (E.D. Va. Feb. 1, 2017), vacated on other grounds, 894 F.3d 121
(4th Cir. 2018) (“[A] lawyer is entitled to rely on what his client tells
him unless, of course, the lawyer has proof to the contrary.” (emphasis
added)); Royal v. Netherland, 4 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (E.D. Va. 1998);
Xcentric Ventures, L.L.C. v. Borodkin, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1048-49 (D.
Ariz. 2012), aff'd, 798 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2015) (“In general, a lawyer is
entitled to rely on information provided by the client. ... Without
knowledge that her client has made specific false statements, an
attorney may, without being guilty of malicious prosecution, vigorously

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Big Rapids Mall Associates, 98 F.3d 926, 932 (6th Cir.1996) (“The lack
of credibility of the Debtor’s principals, while a basis for sanctions
against the principals cannot, without more, serve as a basis for an
award of sanctions against [their lawyers].”).

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In addition, and as the appellees will undoubtedly point out at length (yet within word limits), this utterly fails to engage with the actual sanctions order, and the reasons given in the sanctions order.

Here, again, we're declining to engage the reason for the sanctions, and restating our commitment to the course of conduct that resulted in sanctions in the first place. Recall, if you will, that the primary issue with ding-dong's daffydavits wasn't that they were wrong.

Appellants’ reliance on reams of sworn testimony
to bring suit was reasonable.
Rule 11’s touchstone is reasonableness, and “what constitutes a
reasonable inquiry may depend on such factors as how much time for
investigation was available to the signer; whether he had to rely on a
client for information as to the facts underlying the pleading, motion, or
other paper; whether the pleading, motion, or other paper was based on
a plausible view of the law; or whether he depended on forwarding
counsel or another member of the bar.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (advisory
committee notes) (emphases added).

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Each of these factors has particular salience in an election-law
case litigated under the draconian time-limits of the certification
process. Constrained by the ticking clock, Appellants were required in
large part to rely on others in asserting these claims. But the District
Court does not simply refuse Appellants the benefit of the doubt; it
undertakes an aggressive misreading of the record. From conflating
absurd third-party Twitter comments with Appellants’ legal position
(RE 172, Page ID # 6945-46 & n.31), to asserting that the mere fact
other courts rejected similar claims makes Appellants’ claims frivolous
(id. at 6496),9 to insinuating Appellants are responsible for the events of
January 6, 2021 (id. at 6989-90),10 the District Court does everything
possible to make Appellants seem overwrought, dangerous lunatics.
Under the surface is a different story.
9

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It's that *the statements in the affidavits were conjecture, speculation, and innuendo.* There were no circumstances under which the affidavits in question could have supported the case these people brought.

119

And, for most, no inquiry beyond a trained legal eye was needed to detect this; any lawyer reading (eg) the "we saw bags going into a mail truck after the election" affidavit would immediately know this affidavit is useless as testimony. The contents are irrelevant to the claims.

114

Also, Howard, you've submitted an overlength ranty brief that fails to engage with key parts of the order appealed but does quote the "first we kill all the lawyers" thing. That doesn't help your argument that you aren't an overwrought lunatic.

115

The obfuscation and refusal to directly engage with the district court's findings continues here. The bulk of the citation to Constantino dealt with the factual submissions, and the reasons that it was unreasonable to recycle those affidavits.

For example, the District Court repeatedly cites Costantino v.
Detroit, No. 20-014780-AW (Wayne Cty. Cir. Ct. 2020), as rejecting
Appellants’ legal arguments and factual submissions. But the ruling in
Costantino—the trial court’s November 13 order concluding certain
affidavits before it were too speculative to support relief—was not final;
the Michigan Court of Appeals would not close out its file on just the
interlocutory appeal until January 22, 2021, eight days after Appellants
dismissed this complaint. Leahy v. Orion Twp., 711 N.W.2d 438, 441
(Mich. Ct. App. 2006) (“A decision is final when all appeals have been
exhausted or when the time available for an appeal has passed.”).
Thus, Costantino had not conclusively resolved any of the issues when
Plaintiffs filed their complaint; Appellants could reasonably hope that
the trial court’s ruling would be reversed.

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I'm going to skip the next few pages of ranting and obfuscation - basically, they're doing their best to completely ignore the finding that they failed to meet their ethical obligations in submitting a number of specific affidavits.

I'll just highlight this as a symptom. It - yet again - obfuscates the actual basis for the sanctions, which was not "expressing concerns about vulnerabilities." Meanwhile, the words "spider" and "spyder" don't appear in this filing, despite being present in the sanctions order.

Reading the District Court’s order, however, one would think no
sane person—far less state and federal judges and justices—has ever
expressed concerns about the voting systems in place during the 2020
11 The Georgia Secretary of State recently joined the plaintiffs in that
case in calling for release of a secret report on vulnerabilities in voting
machines made by the same manufacturer as used in Michigan. Ga.
Sec. State Press Office, Secretary Raffensperger Calls on J. Alex
Halderman To Agree To Release “Secret Report” and Pre-Election
Testimony (Jan. 27, 2022), available at https://tinyurl.com/bder999d.
Case: 21-1786 Document: 22 Filed: 02/07/2022 Page: 34
26
Presidential Election.12 Reading its order one would also think that
there were final judicial findings from other courts to which Plaintiffs
owed absolute deference.

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Moving on - I'm going to include the page they cite next to their argument here. Pro tip: Trying to retcon the fundamental nature of your own earlier argument rarely works.

The District Court went on to scorn the serious chain-of-custody
issues and other irregularities that Appellants pointed out, reasoning
that, since none of the acts violated Michigan law, it was sanctionable
to rely on them. RE 172, Page ID # 6947. But Plaintiffs’ allegations
concerning vote miscounting and manipulation unquestionably stated a
claim for violation of Michigan and federal law, and the District Court
did not consider whether, e.g., evidence of chain-of-custody issues, “has
any tendency to make” vote miscounting or manipulation “more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.”

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Plaintiffs alleged that certain acts or events violated the Michigan Election Code when, in fact, they did not.
To support the allegation that Defendants violated Michigan election laws by accepting “unsecured ballots . . . without any chain of custody,”35 the Amended Complaint states that Whitney Meyers “observed passengers in cars dropping off more ballots than there were people in the car.”36 But when the Court asked Plaintiffs’ counsel whether individuals other than the voter can drop off a ballot in Michigan, Campbell answered in the affirmative. (ECF No. 157 at Pg ID 5486.) And of course, anyone easily could have learned this by consulting Michigan law. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.764a (explaining at Step 5(c) that a household member or family member (as defined by Michigan law) may return a voter’s absentee ballot). It seems to the Court, then, that Plaintiffs’ counsel knew or should have known that this conduct did not violate existing state law.

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And the district court's point here was that it was unreasonable for *lawyers* to rely on how things look to "an untrained lawyer" instead of investigating whether that appearance has a basis in reality.

Even the District
Court’s preferred source, Costantino, contained testimony from an
adverse witness that “[t]o an untrained observer[,] it may appear that
12 Less than two weeks ago, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
struck down that state’s legislatively adopted expansion of eligibility to
vote by mail. McLinko v. Commw. of Penn., Dep't of State, No. 244 M.D.
2021, 2022 WL 257659 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 28, 2022). Abuses of the
vote-by-mail process were among the many irregularities documented
by Plaintiffs’ evidence in this case. See infra pp. 34-36, 42-43.
Case: 21-1786 Document: 22 Filed: 02/07/2022 Page: 35
27
the ballot is being counted twice.” Id. at 6950 n.41. Yet Appellants get
no leeway for complaining about something that even an adverse expert
describes as a plausible view of events.

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And the term of art for what the PA decision discussed in the footnote, which was entirely based on PA constitutional provisions, has to do with anything at all that's relevant here is "fuckall."