Geoffrey MillerVerified account

What was the supposed counterexample?

They were assuming I thought that every piece of knowledge could be undermined by raising stakes sufficiently high. I don't think this, so it didn't work.

What property must a piece of knowledge have to be immune to that kind of undermining? Just being really certain like knowledge of basic arithmetic truths? (perhaps you addressed this in you book, but it's been some time).

Yes. I mean, presumably we have so much evidence for certain truths that no amount of raised stakes will defeat that evidence. The bare claim of stakes sensitivity doesn't undermine that possibility.

I thought you said we couldn't be 100% certain of anything (empirical, but I think we're as fallible with the a priori stuff). Is this just an implication of ought implies can? What if psychologically, we could doubt these things--could they be epistemically undermined then?

I'm not sure I said this, but if I did, it's not an essential part of pragmatic encroachment. Basic arithmetical truths seem like a good case.

I just mean on twitter when we were talking about the Cofnas paper you said it when I asked if I should be 100 percent certain the genetic hypothesis was wrong. Not in any publication or something.

I think we can be as certain that the genetic hypothesis is wrong as, say, that the earth isn't flat.