Socratweets Smith

@philosofeed

Philosophy for the modern attention span.

Vrijeme pridruživanja: travanj 2011.

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  1. 28. tra 2011.

    If morality is response-dependent, why is the right reaction to moral disagreement unlike that to disagreement over mere preferences?

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  2. 26. tra 2011.

    Say aim X's constitutive of agency. I'll be a shmagent—agent sans aim X. So normativity isn't grounded in the constitution of agency.

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  3. 25. tra 2011.

    Some attitudes deems authoritative don't describe what matters to us. So they can't ground reasons to be rational.

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  4. 25. tra 2011.

    The "first-personal authority" of those attitudes that describe what matters to one ensures one always has reason to be rational.

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  5. 24. tra 2011.

    From global : If X is wrong in a world like ours, X is wrong. So error theory is true only if metaphysically necessary.

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  6. 23. tra 2011.

    The isn't just a problem for utilitarians. Anyone committed to transitivity of value can be led to the same conclusion.

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  7. 23. tra 2011.

    Utilitarians say 2 happy is better than 1 a bit happier. So billions with lives barely worth living is better than both.

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  8. 22. tra 2011.

    Self-interest can generate justice (i.e. fairness) via elimination of knowledge of who (from a set of possible identities) one is.

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  9. 20. tra 2011.

    's test is useless if the entailed non-moral change has causal power. So alter moral facts that depend on historical ones.

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  10. 20. tra 2011.

    If X is causally inert, then altering X alters nothing further. Beliefs alter with moral facts. So moral facts have causal power.

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  11. 20. tra 2011.

    Historical facts are causally inert. Some moral facts supervene on historical facts. So some moral facts are causally inert.

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  12. 20. tra 2011.

    Perception requires a causal link running from perceived to perceiver. The moral is causally inefficacious. So there is no moral perception.

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  13. 20. tra 2011.

    By learning to match up various symbols one might falsely appear fluent in Chinese. Analogously A.I. may merely mimic understanding.

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  14. 19. tra 2011.

    Epistemic success entails a belief-truth correlation. Explaining this correlation is a challenge, particularly for moral realism.

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  15. 19. tra 2011.

    's water case doesn't go for moral terms. So they don't get their meaning from the natural stuff that fixes their use.

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  16. 19. tra 2011.

    Imagine a world like ours where the watery stuff isn't H20. "Water" wouldn't mean the same there. So meaning just ain't in the head.

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  17. 19. tra 2011.

    Things are good in virtue of their non-moral properties. So there is no moral difference between otherwise identical worlds.

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  18. 19. tra 2011.

    Does God decide what's good or recognize it? If the former morality seems arbitrary; the latter seems to violate His omnipotence.

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  19. 18. tra 2011.

    If God exists, belief means infinite joy, denial infinite suffering. Either way, belief is cheap. Belief seems like a good bet.

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  20. 18. tra 2011.

    God is all-good/knowing/powerful. If there were a being like that there would be no evil. There is evil. So there is no God.

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