Argues that constructionism in feminism specifically does not imply nominalism, but realist. Points to Haslanger's "debunking project," how social kinds can be *covertly* established & sustained, the structural implications of these kinds, & the intertwining of categories
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Charleton offers an account of the sensitive soul (as a corporeal substance) and its relation with the rational soul: they each have a direct effect on one another, but regularly conflict. For Charleton, the ideal state is that of tranquility. His four-steps of the passions
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1) the corporeal imagination conceives what is desirable/repulsive 2) arranged into an appetite-proper by the movements of the brain 3) translated to the regulated physiological operation of the heart 4) this arrangement of movements is given form as an idea by the rational soul
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Charleston's adoption of Descartes: 1) ordering our passions offers better wellbeing, 2) ordering our passions leads to virtue. For both, there is an intimate connection between mental & bodily health. But Charleton departs from Descartes with respect to the idea of tranquility.
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Charleton suggests that moderation is the most important principle in achieving tranquility (in the sense of Epicurean ataraxia). Generosity is one the primary virtues that gives us this moderation.
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Finally Emily Hughes speaking on the emotion and affectivity in phenomenology. Can a general account of emotion be drawn from phenomenology, what are the important differences between phenomenologists, and what might this intervene in contemporary understandings of emotion?
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Phenomenology has tended to take the living human being as a whole, rather than sets of bodily responses, as the centre of emotions. Emotions are enactive, and disclosive of oneself, others, and world.
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For Husserl, feeling-sensations (bodily) & feeling-acts (intentionally grounded & directed) are hierarchically distinct. In other cases, where the centrality of intentionality is challenged, feelings, emotions & moods come to be understood as distinct in terms of disclosive power
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There is a different understanding of the relationship between self and world - particularly in terms of intentionality, directedness, values & reason - in the former "realist phenomenologist" tradition and the latter (existential?) account.
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Onto Session Three, starting with Brianni Li with a talk on what Adorno and Foucault's understandings of authentic action, social change & pseudo-activity. Seeks to examine how each of these thinkers lays possibilities for social change.
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In Adorno's account of instrumental reason, there is a sense in which the logic of domination(drawn out of the tendency of the subject to impose itself on all outside it)has wholly colonised social life. This establishment of instrumental order dissolves negative critical praxis
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Adorno's cynicism lies in the conclusion that *autonomous thinking* - the only rejection of instrumental reason - is inhibited by practical praxis because the domain of practice requires an adoption of instrumental reason. Applying theory to political contexts is pseudo-activity.
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But in Foucault's explicit formulation of an account of power, power is a fact of social relations, not a monumental & irreversible historical shift. Because of this, theory already participates in power relations, and emerges as a response to the power operations of institutions
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From this analysis we can formulate, via negative means, an understanding of authentic action. That is, the application of theory faces specific risks of becoming pseudo-activity: losing the autonomy of critical thought (Adorno), and becoming a top-down imposition (Foucault)
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Onto Wendyl Luna, speaking on the role of Kant in Foucault's reconstruction of the concept of parrēsia. Suggests that for Foucault, the *public use of reason* in Kant's understanding of Enlightenment functions as a retrieval of parrēsia from its Hellenic roots.
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Looks to how Foucault suggests, in a very general sense, that modern philosophy from Descartes onwards reprises the Greek problem of parrēsia (after it is corrupted by the Christian pastoral tradition) by returning to the question of how one ought to conduct oneself.
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Then examines Foucault's Greek specific account of parrēsia through the encounter of Plato and Diogenes: there is a specific way in which the public use of reason is *philosophically problematised* and contested on political grounds.
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Onto Kant and the public in Foucault: in Kant the public is considered to be the academic intellectual reader & contributor - this *culture of a written medium* is the space of universality & freedom. Asks: How is this intellectual community meaningfully free and universal?
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Finally to William Hebblewhite
@Whebblewhite on the role of Kant's transcendental aesthetics in Jacques Rancière's concept of the *Partage du Sensible* (one translation of which is "distribution of the sensible")Prikaži ovu nit -
Suggests that though this may not offer a faithful reading of Rancière, it is nevertheless philosophically significant to treat his account of the sensible in transcendental terms. Begins with a reading of Kant's transcendental aesthetic, and looks to transpose it to Rancière.
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Suggests that while Kant's account of sensibility is purely passive, and allows us to derive the pure forms of space (outer sense) and time (inner sense), for Rancière it is active.
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The distribution of the sensible, approached from this direction, involves carving up our sensible life and history into a territory of sensible experience. Kant offers us an understanding of *how* the subjective arrangement of sense comes about.
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