Sometimes I wonder if the real vector for fixing “X business was attacked; Y million personal identifiers were accessed” is to ratchet up on-opening and post-opening identity verification in the financial industry such that knowing 4 facts about someone isn’t worth $Xk++.
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Card issuers (and other participants of the financial industry, but in the main, card issuers) benefit enormously from keeping the barriers to conversion very low. They’ve been going down as the number of compromised identities has been going up. This dynamic funds the hacks.
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Maybe we need to tell issuers “OK, you issued a credit card without authorization from the putative customer, and took a $600 fraud loss. You just forfeited the identity security bond; take the $10k hit this quarter.” (This would not be a consequence free policy!)
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