@paulmclellan "we don't know how to completely protect against this type of attack without reducing processor performance to a few percent (under 5%) of what it is today". That's completely wrong. That would be the simplest and worst way to fix it. We know how to do much better.
That's just the easy stuff, but nowhere near sufficient to completely protect against speculation attacks. You also must not speculate at all on anything that effects any resource that is shared with another compute thread. No main memory access, no shared caches, ...
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... no hyper-threading (because then everything would be shared), no sharing of FPUs etc between cores, and so on. Because roll back isn't helping you if another thread can already see the speculation while it is happening.
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But nobody knows how to generate an exhaustive list of all relevant side channels and when nobody knows how to generate such an exhaustive list then nobody knows how to build a secure processor that speculates.
End of conversation
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