Naoko Aoki

@naokoaoki

Congressional fellow, researcher with expertise in East Asian security issues, PhD, former journalist. Views are my own.

Washington D.C.
Vrijeme pridruživanja: lipanj 2009.

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  1. proslijedio/la je Tweet

    The tensions among the United States, Japan, and South Korea work to North Korea's advantage. explains:

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    North Korea began 2020 by announcing it was no longer bound by the moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests. This is bad news for all countries in the region, says , but especially for Japan. Here's why:

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  3. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    26. sij

    Without strong policy coordination between Japan, the United States and South Korea, North Korea could become emboldened in flight-testing missiles in Japan’s exclusive economic zone.

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  4. 25. sij

    North Korea's shift to a hardline approach is good for none in the region, but particularly unwelcome for Japan. In my piece in , I argue that Japan's best shot at dealing with North Korea remains coordination with U.S. and South Korea.

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  5. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    14. sij

    While all eyes are on Iran, China trade deal, impeachment... The Treasury Dept. blacklisted two companies today (one from Beijing, one from Pyongyang) for violating North Korea sanctions. My latest here, with comment from and :

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    "Kim Jong-un is preparing the public for a prolonged confrontation with the United States ... lowering expectations for the lifting of sanctions and preparing the public for economic hardships ahead." —

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  7. 4. sij

    Obviously not everything is about , but I think the country is following the US-Iran situation and that what makes the recent US attack striking to it is that the strike aimed at leadership decapitation. I spoke with about this.

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  8. 2. sij

    North Korea announced a policy shift that emphasizes strategic weapons development and self-reliance on the economic front, given the likelihood of a prolonged standoff with the U.S. My comments at , with gratitude for the opportunity

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  9. 22. pro 2019.

    The leaders of China, Japan and South Korea will meet this week as the North Korean threat looms. I spoke with about the symbolic importance of this meeting. I also think the Japan-South Korea summit on the sidelines is important for region.

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  10. 15. pro 2019.

    Tensions with are about to increase, but we don't quite know yet by how much. North Korean provocations may involve an ICBM test, or something less. I talked to about the possibilities.

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  11. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    7. stu 2019.

    Meanwhile, in Pyongyang: "idiot," "villain," "dwarf," an “under-wit” Just some of the insults a top NK official had for Japan PM Abe after he said NK's last missile test violated sanctions. My story here; comments from

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  12. proslijedio/la je Tweet
    1. stu 2019.

    VERY excited about this! A fantastic lineup of speakers will be joining us in Bloomington next Friday to discuss -Japan relations. Part of our effort to turn into a Midwestern hub for contemporary Japan social science and policy studies! Open to the public!

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  13. 9. ruj 2019.

    Will the US and resume working level talks later this month? I am reupping my piece in from July that talks about some of the challenges US negotiators face.

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  14. 23. kol 2019.

    I talked to about how the political rift between Japan and South Korea is spreading into the military and economic arenas, benefitting North Korea, China and Russia.

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  15. 12. kol 2019.

    This suggests a pressure campaign against North Korea needs to more carefully consider how it would interact with North Korean policy priorities. Pressure should be applied only to pursue specific achievable goals and should be frequently assessed for its impact.

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  16. 12. kol 2019.

    Pressure may also have compelled North Korea to declare that its “state nuclear force” was complete before being fully confident that it could hit the U.S. mainland, although that depends on whether it was aiming for an operational ICBM capability.

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  17. 12. kol 2019.

    But what about the military threats and economic sanctions that targeted North Korea in 2017? They may have encouraged the country to speed up its effort to develop the capacity to strike the U.S. with a nuclear-armed missile, the opposite of its intended effect.

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  18. 12. kol 2019.

    Why did North Korea shift from confrontation to diplomacy in 2018? In my piece , I conclude that North Korea’s security calculus best explains the change. wanted to achieve its security goals first and followed through with its plan.

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  19. 15. srp 2019.

    Both sides have to be empowered by their leaders to negotiate, which has not been the case so far. I hope the working level talks resume soon, and I don't mean to be pessimistic, but this is not going to be easy.

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  20. 15. srp 2019.

    On the one hand, North Koreans' willingness to negotiate may have a time limit because of the 2020 US presidential elections. On the other hand, the task of negotiating a denuclearization deal is more complicated than it has ever been before.

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