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  1. Pinned Tweet
    29 Jan 2017

    List of non-US contact points for crypto/security PhD applicants (by )

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  2. Feb 1

    Today’s energy.

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  3. Retweeted
    Jan 27

    I had to get a background check for my job, and it turns out the report is a 300+ page pdf of every single tweet I’ve ever liked with the work “fuck” in it. Enjoy your dystopian bs! *waves*

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  4. Feb 1

    Please tell me this is a macabre Twitter joke and not a thing that someone planned.

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  5. Retweeted
    Jan 31

    Over the last 25 years, while law enforcement was off complaining about encryption, we've LITERALLY BUILT A SOCIETY THAT'S DEPENDENT ON IT. We absolutely cannot afford to scare service providers away from providing it themselves or allowing it over-the-top of their own services.

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  6. Retweeted

    I was today years old when I found out that has a note to self feature which also supports disappearing messages.

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  7. Jan 31

    Same game at 60hz.

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  8. Jan 31

    My son spent weeks saving up for a 144hz gaming monitor. I thought he was nuts until I filmed it in slow motion. (You can see 60hz lights flickering for reference.)

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  9. Jan 31

    The latest update to just seems to crash instantly on my phone, so today has been more productive.

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  10. Retweeted
    Jan 31

    Christ, the EARN IT Act is just so brain-breakingly stupid. It would allow the AG to write "best practices" making providers legally liable for offering end-to-end encryption. OK, well, what's to stop people from separately encrypting data and *then* transmitting it?

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  11. Retweeted
    Replying to

    As we are laying out in a paper I’ve been tinkering with for months, I think detection of known CSAM on E2EE will not have as positive a ratio of impact to privacy risk as other mitigations aimed at abuses where the victim is part of the conversation.

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  12. Jan 31

    15. “Let’s build encryption systems that are somehow compatible with (currently well-intentioned) mass surveillance, and hand them over to politicians who have displayed no consistent principles in seeking this capability” does not feel like the winning move in this game. //END

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  13. Jan 31

    14. It is really hard for me to look at this kind of legislation (and the underlying, constantly shifting law enforcement strategy) and say “yes, these people are working with good intent to solve a problem, let’s make things easier for them.”

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  14. Jan 31

    13. This thread has been long and I want to end it on a different note. There are a number of thoughtful people, including notably , who feel that tech providers need to work harder to find ways to square this circle: ie allow encryption and CSAM detection to co-exist.

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  15. Jan 31

    12. The commission has to consider privacy and security. But that consideration is all they’re required to do. And even if they do recommend encryption: the AG can just override whatever they decide. And those problems are the tip of the iceberg.

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  16. Jan 31

    11. In short, the bill establishes an unelected comission, which must consist of “4 law enforcement reps, 4 tech industry reps, 2 reps of child safety organizations, and 2 computer scientists/software engineering experts”. They’ll decide what the best practices are.

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  17. Jan 31

    10. The basic strategy of this law is to make providers (Apple, Facebook, Google etc.) criminally liable for CSAM, unless they comply with a set of “recommended best practices” for detecting the stuff. But who determines those practices, and is encryption one of them?

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  18. Jan 31

    9. All of this has just been a prelude to describing the new proposed legislation discusses. This legislation is being introduced by Senators Graham and Blumenthal, and it reads like a “backdoor” attempt to squash end-to-end encryption.

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  19. Jan 31

    8. Technically, the request is also a radical new ask. Previously, law enforcement wanted “exceptional access” — meaning only occasionally would they need to decrypt things. But CSAM scanning can’t be “exceptional”. It has to scan every single image you send.

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  20. Jan 31

    7. I am *deeply* skeptical of Barr’s motivation here. After several years of opposing encryption on very different grounds (criminals, terrorists) and asking for access only with a warrant, suddenly making a hard right turn and saying “think about the children” — feels cynical.

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  21. Jan 31

    6. End-to-end encryption disrupts this CSAM scanning process, because, well, let’s be honest, these scanners are a mass surveillance system — one with a specific (well-meaning) intent — and end-to-end encryption is designed to *stop* mass surveillance.

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