Just saying "use paper ballots" isn't enough to fix this. Backend election system security is a nationwide issue that requires close and ongoing attention from local, state, and national officials.
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এই থ্রেডটি দেখান
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The backend systems in Kim's piece aren't the end-user voting machines, and they have nothing to do one way or the other with whether paper ballots are used. They're used by officials for everything from voter registration database management to ballot design to result tallying.
এই থ্রেডটি দেখান -
Worth noting also that to the extent there's been publicly-released evidence of Russian tampering with US election systems, it's been directed at these (boring. mostly ignored) backend systems, not at voting machines themselves.
এই থ্রেডটি দেখান -
Now, let me be clear. I'm not saying paper ballots aren't important or necessary. That's a critically important step in securing our elections. But there's more to it than that, and the solutions involve more than slogans. It will require sustained resources and attention.
এই থ্রেডটি দেখান -
Anyway, I wrote more extensively about this in my testimony last year in the House. http://www.mattblaze.org/papers/blaze-govtreform-20171129.pdf …
এই থ্রেডটি দেখান -
I've said it before, I'll say it again. In the more than quarter century I've been doing computer security, I've never encountered a problem space nearly as difficult or complex as civil elections.
এই থ্রেডটি দেখান -
Final thought: If you're worried about the integrity of the 2018 election, it's extremely unlikely that many jurisdictions could change their voting machine technology at this point even if they wanted to. Focus on getting them resources to secure registration & back end systems.
এই থ্রেডটি দেখান
কথা-বার্তা শেষ
নতুন কথা-বার্তা -
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As you noted, Matt, there are so many other (easier to break/manipulate) parts of the voting systems. e.g control registration or gerrymandering & you’ve taken over the vote. Paper audit trails are more essential than paper ballots.
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I think that's right for state-actor treats, but there are also significant retail threats that voter-marked ballots helps counter. Historically, most election fraud in the US has been for local offices.
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s/treats/threats/ Though treats are nice, too.
কথা-বার্তা শেষ
নতুন কথা-বার্তা -
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Preach!!! I'm very thankful you are one of the few that hasn't burned out on this over the years
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It's sometimes helpful to pull back and observe that we've actually made real progress on voting machine security. Paperless DREs are a dying breed, and states are starting to listen on things like RLEs. So your work is paying off - don't forget!
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That's a good point... I need to be reminded from time to time that my pants aren't actually on fire.pic.twitter.com/dHqNP66uqg
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You've been one of the guiding lights for all this progress, never forget that.
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নতুন কথা-বার্তা -
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Also, I'd venture to guess that you'd file the VVPAT systems and the processes around them as nearly in the first category, whereas these attacks are in the latter two?pic.twitter.com/1hYuMlE7KN
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Yeah, I think that's right.
কথা-বার্তা শেষ
নতুন কথা-বার্তা -
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Right. Voting is a *system*, with many moving parts and processes.
ধন্যবাদ। আপনার সময়রেখাকে আরো ভালো করে তুলতে টুইটার এটিকে ব্যবহার করবে। পূর্বাবস্থায়পূর্বাবস্থায়
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Good info! Now I’m wondering about what really happened in Florida with our votes for Gore. Vote anyway.
ধন্যবাদ। আপনার সময়রেখাকে আরো ভালো করে তুলতে টুইটার এটিকে ব্যবহার করবে। পূর্বাবস্থায়পূর্বাবস্থায়
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ধন্যবাদ। আপনার সময়রেখাকে আরো ভালো করে তুলতে টুইটার এটিকে ব্যবহার করবে। পূর্বাবস্থায়পূর্বাবস্থায়
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লোড হতে বেশ কিছুক্ষণ সময় নিচ্ছে।
টুইটার তার ক্ষমতার বাইরে চলে গেছে বা কোনো সাময়িক সমস্যার সম্মুখীন হয়েছে আবার চেষ্টা করুন বা আরও তথ্যের জন্য টুইটারের স্থিতি দেখুন।
