Q: Considering the success of pentests and attackers at horizontal/vertical movement on unsegmented networks once they have code execution, is Meltdown/Spectre an expectional, new category of risk to most orgs? How would cross-VM disclosure/privesc suddenly be required to win?
There's no *public PoC* for Meltdown-in-browser but it's obviously possible. The exploit code is identical to Spectre-variant1. The only difference is you bounds-bypass all the way to kernel-space. That's it. Browsers have acknowledged the risk.
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I think we might not be disagreeing here. :)
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