Q: Considering the success of pentests and attackers at horizontal/vertical movement on unsegmented networks once they have code execution, is Meltdown/Spectre an expectional, new category of risk to most orgs? How would cross-VM disclosure/privesc suddenly be required to win?
Meltdown is worse than your average privesc because it lets you tunnel right through the mitigation stack, though. Sandboxing, process separation, ASLR, it all disappears. You get physical memory reads from any random Javascript running in a browser.
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Like I said earlier, this privesc is "more" than the usual because of the reduced number of steps it takes compared to our normal understanding of privilege escalation. That said, I'm not aware of any Meltdown-in-browser. Variant 1 (Spectre) is the browser risk.
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There's no *public PoC* for Meltdown-in-browser but it's obviously possible. The exploit code is identical to Spectre-variant1. The only difference is you bounds-bypass all the way to kernel-space. That's it. Browsers have acknowledged the risk.
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