Of course, they aren't admitting to it publicly. The question is how many countries, companies, and other users of Infineon chips are quietly sweeping ROCA under the rug and ignoring the fact that their security is now *utterly broken* until updated?https://twitter.com/marcan42/status/928171103607865345 …
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Replying to @marcan42
As long as they’re working hard to find out which ones are affected and replacing them now, I’m fine with no communication until done.
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Replying to @SwissHttp
So you're fine with them leaving all their users vulnerable to complete and utter impersonation until they manage to deploy a fix? The vulnerabiilty is public *today*, hackers don't wait until you're done with logistics.
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Replying to @marcan42
I’m not fine with doing nothing. It’s just that communication probably won’t change much. How are these NFC features used?
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Replying to @SwissHttp
The NFC features are tangential; what matters is that signatures made with these ID cards (I/O method doesn't matter) have *complete legal equivalence* to written signatures, and this is used by many companies and government institutions.
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Replying to @marcan42 @SwissHttp
Literally, we're in a window where anyone in Spain who owns one of these cards and has ever used it (certificates with a factorable modulus exist) can have their electronic identity completely and utterly stolen.
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Replying to @marcan42
I’m just asking which part you can avoid by communication to everyone. If there is something where it helps, then yes, do it.
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Replying to @SwissHttp
The point of communicating to everyone is *informing* that the system is broken and that it should not be trusted. The bad guys already know. The good guys need to know. It means things like not accepting e-signed docs without further checks.
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Replying to @marcan42 @SwissHttp
For comparison, SSL CAs are required to revoke ROCA-vulnerable certs within 24h of being made aware of their existence (and are expected to proactively check everything they've issued for the ROCA fingerprint).
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The *right* way to do this would've been to develop a fix in the, oh, 6 months Infineon had to get critical customers on board, then at public disclosure revoke all remaining certs and say "sorry, visit an eID kiosk and renew your certs/update your firmware".
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