So, yeah. The wpa_supplicant bug only lets you *impersonate* an AP. It does *NOT* let you MITM it or passively decrypt. This is important.
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If you're on a corporate network, an attacker *cannot* transparently MITM you. They can decrypt sent packets but they're *dropped*.
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Replying to @marcan42
Picture: using corporate network, using web browser with usual configuration, on average sites
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most sites don't use HSTS, so you can SSLStrip and MITM internet access easily
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this implies the user is "trusting WAN", yes, but most people don't even know what that means
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usually the expectation is that local WPA2 will protect against attacks on a local network, because attacking the uplink is harder
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Replying to @11rcombs
Sure, but most people use random public WiFi anyway, or would be tricked by a same/similar SSID with no security.
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Replying to @marcan42
yeah, which means it comes down to "this is only a problem because so much shit is already fucked"
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also, contrast with the bugs in other implementations, which AIUI _do_ allow transparent decryption
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(in one direction only, and nontrivially, but yes)
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Replying to @marcan42
my take, in general, is "this breaks a lot of the security guarantees of WPA2, but _you should never be relying on those anyway_"
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